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Abstract
I develop a model of reciprocal altruism which accounts for some ev-
idence in contracting situations, which are paradoxical from the point of
view of neoclassical contract theory with selfish actors. My model predicts
the crowding-out effect, observed in the Trust Game with the possibility
of a fine; for the Control Game the model predicts that an equilibrium can
exhibit ”no effect of control”, ”hidden cost of control”, or ”positive effect
of control”, depending on the characteristics of the actors, as observed in
the experiments. This suggests that reciprocal altruism modeling could
be fruitful more generally in applications of contract theory.
Keywords: Contract Theory, Signaling, Behavioral Economics, Reciprocal
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1 Introduction
Intriguing observations about human response to incentives have recently been
made. For instance, providing additional incentives can, in contrast with stan-
dard models with selfish actors, lead to lower levels of performance and in-
tentions seem to matter, according to Fehr and Rockenbach [2003], Falk and
Kosfeld [2006] and many others1.
In this paper I develop a Principal-Agent model embodying reciprocal al-
truism. The paper shows that a simple formal model of reciprocal altruism is
able to give reliable predictions for some patterns of human behavior, puzzling
when considered within the standard selfish paradigm. While the idea that reci-
procity, altruism and other forms of social preferences shape people’s behavior
is not new, there are only a few models of reciprocal altruism in the literature.
My model is based on the premise that a person cares more about those
who care more about him. In other words, a person is more altruistic towards
∗I’m grateful to Jean Tirole for many insightful discussions. I’m also grateful to Stefanie
Brillon, Andrey Bremzen, Robert Dur, Arjan Non, the participants of the BEE workshop
in Toulouse, and the participants at seminars at ECARES(Brussels), Gothenburg University,
CEFIR(Moscow) for their comments. All errors are mine.
1See below the more detailed discussion of the relevant literature.
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those whom he perceives as being altruistic towards him. This is the essence of
the reciprocal altruism. In a Principal-Agent relationship, an altruistic Agent
is inspired to exert effort even in the absence of monetary incentives, i.e. the
Agent’s altruism works as an intrinsic motivator. If furthermore, the Agent is
reciprocal, the Principal will want to demonstrate his altruism in order to boost
the Agent’s intrinsic motivation. This leads to a signaling game in which the
Principal signals his altruism through offering a ”generous” contract.
I assume that the population of the Principals and the Agents is heteroge-
nous: together with selfish actors there are pro-social ones, who are more altru-
istic and reciprocal.
I consider two variants of the model, closely related to existing lab experi-
ments, and so the model’s equilibrium can be tested by the experiments’ out-
comes.
In the first setting, the Principal can either restrict the Agent’s choice of
effort by imposing minimal effort or give the Agent full flexibility, so that he
can exert zero effort. Such contract resembles the Control Game experiment of
Falk and Kosfeld [2006].
The predictions, based on the selfishness framework, are in striking contrast
with what has been observed in the lab. In fact, if all the actors are selfish,
in equilibrium the Principal restricts the Agent’s effort, who, in turn, chooses
the minimal feasible effort. Were the Agent uncontrolled, he would exert zero
effort.
However, in the experiment the Principals often choose not to control and,
after this, many Agents perform at much higher level than zero. Moreover, the
average effort of the uncontrolled Agents is higher than that of the controlled
ones for some values of the minimum effort cut-off. In other words, the Prin-
cipal’s action is often a deviation from the equilibrium path for selfish players,
and after this deviation, many Agents deviate from the continuation subgame
optimal move. I argue, however, that these ”deviations” fit the equilibrium path
if the actors’s population has a pro-social component and is heterogenous.
Intuitively, the reciprocal (pro-social) Agents’ intrinsic motivation is raised
and so they perform at high level when they’ve learned that the Principal is
pro-social, or generous. The Principal can signal her generosity through not
restricting the Agent, i.e. by offering the generous contract. This explains why
the pro-social Principals don’t control on the equilibrium path and why the
pro-social Agents respond by high performance. However, the selfish Agents’
intrinsic motivation can’t be boosted (because of weak or zero pro-social com-
ponent in preferences) and they perform at zero level if not controlled. So, the
observed performance of the uncontrolled Agents is either high or zero. Fi-
nally, the selfish Principals prefer to control and guarantee from all Agents a
relatively low performance, equal to the controlling threshold, because they are
less confident in the pro-sociality of the Agents’ population than the pro-social
Principals.
In the second setting, the Principal chooses whether to punish the Agent
for low performance, and chooses the threshold below which the performance
is considered to be low. After receiving the contract from the Principal, the
Agent can accept or reject it. The contract resembles the variant of the Trust
Game experiment of Fehr and Rockenbach [2003]. As in the first setting, the
outcome of the experiment is puzzling if the actors are assumed to be selfish.
In fact, within the selfishness framework, in equilibrium the Principal requires
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effort, while satisfying the Agent’s participation constraint, and threatens the
Agent with the punishment, which provides him an extrinsic incentive. If the
Principal chooses not to punish, the Agent should perform at zero level, since
extrinsic incentives aren’t provided. However, in the experiment the Principals
often choose not to punish, and, responding to this, many Agents choose to
perform at the level which is much higher than zero. These behaviors clearly
represent a deviation from the equilibrium path in the game with selfish actors.
By contrast, when threatened with the punishment for low performance, most
of the Agents choose the minimal performance level to avoid punishment, just
as on the equilibrium path of the selfish players case.
As in the first setting, my analysis shows that the ”deviating” actions lie
on the equilibrium path in the signaling game with heterogenous actors and a
pro-social component in the population. The mechanism behind the separating
equilibrium with the same structure, as observed in the experiment, is similar
to the one for the Control Game.
The behavioral patterns, supporting reciprocity and observed in the exper-
iments are not limited to the lab, they are common in human relations, in
the workplace in particular. The evidence from the field is documented in
Gneezy [2002], Falk [2007], Bolton and Ockenfels [2008], Paarsch and Shearer
[2007], Shearer [2004], Bellemare and Shearer [2007], Berry and Kanouse [1987],
Mare´chal and Tho¨ni [2007].2
Broadly taken, my study contributes to the literature on behavioral theory
of incentives, and one of its aims is explaining the puzzling behavior observed
in the lab and in the field by taking into account the interaction between ex-
trinsic incentives3 and intrinsic motivation4, which can lead, for instance, to
the motivation crowding-out. I show that reciprocal altruism can account for
many systematically observed behavior patterns given a natural information
structure. Be´nabou and Tirole [2003] and Be´nabou and Tirole [2006a] argue
that the impact of incentives on intrinsic motivation shapes behavior in many
2However, Kube et al. [2006] found support for negative reciprocity and question positive
reciprocity, especially in the long-run. Gneezy and List [2006] found reciprocity in the short-
run (the first 2 hours of work) and decreasing reciprocity in the long-run: to the end of
the 6-hour job the subjects receiving a more generous wage didn’t work harder than the
others. Some studies question the relevance of the lab experiments - see, e.g. List [2007],
Hennig-Schmidt et al. [2005], List and Levitt [2005]. We should be warned by these studies
but evidence for reciprocity comes from many different sources, so it’s hard to question that
reciprocity is an important psychological characteristic of human beings.
3The list of extrinsic motivators is not limited to the incentive payments (piece-rate wage or
bonus payment) but includes also expectation of future material payoff e.g. reputation building
due to long-term interaction, strategic reciprocity, career concerns, comparative performance
based payment (tournaments), monitoring/control etc.
4The literature provides evidence for many kinds of intrinsic motivation, apart from al-
truism and reciprocity. The Ultimatum Game introduced by Gu¨th et al. [1982] illustrates
that taste for fairness and/or inequality aversion is an important factor determining behavior;
another evidence for fairness comes from different versions of the Gift Exchange Game - see
Fehr et al. [1993], Fehr and Falk [1999]. Social norms (avoiding social disapproval/geting
social approval) influence economic decisions. People can change their behavior under peer
pressure or have a taste for the social embeddedness. The evidence are provided by a variant
of the Gift Exchange Game in Ga¨chter and Falk [2002] and Third Party Punishment Game
by Fehr and Fischbacher [2004]. A person may have taste for the others’ belief about his
motivation (or type) - see Rabin [1993], Falk and Fischbacher [2006] and Be´nabou and Tirole
[2006a]. The list of intrinsic motivators can be continued with self-learning, working on inter-
esting/challenging task (in this case effort may not be costly (painful), the job rather gives
fun and higher effort increases utility) etc.
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different contexts.
My paper is also related to the theoretical literature on reciprocity or social
norms. Falk and Fischbacher [2006] develop a theory of reciprocity based on
psychological games, i.e. with utilities of the actors depending not only on
their material payoffs, but also on the perceived intentions of another player,
i.e. on the 1-st and 2-nd order beliefs, following Rabin [1993]. The players’
concern about the equitable outcome plays an important role in the analysis, in
contrast with my model, which is based on reciprocal altruism. The model of
Falk and Fischbacher [2006] can explain behavior in the Ultimatum Game, the
Gift Exchange Game and some other experiments.
The model of Ellingsen and Johannesson [2008] can account for the crowding-
out effect. It is similar to mine in that they consider altruistic actors. One
difference is that they also incorporate the taste for social esteem (pride) in the
utility function, i.e. second-order beliefs. Another difference is that the actors
in their model are unconditionally altruistic.
The model of Sliwka [2007] can also account for crowding-out through a
mechanism based on social norms, which is different from mine. There are
reliable and unreliable Agents in his model. The reliable Agents follow the
contract whereas the unreliable ones can deviate even if a contract is signed. As
a consequence, the incentive scheme has to be high-powered for the unreliable
Agents to perform at a high level. This leads to the fact that observing the
high-powered incentive scheme, the Agent can learn that there is a social norm
to be unreliable which can crowd-out his intrinsic motivation based on inherent
reliability.
In a recent paper Dur [2008] analyzes a model based on reciprocal altruism,
following Levine [1998] and putting it in the context of the workplace relation.
He shows that non-contractible attention can substitute monetary compensation
in a Principal-Agent relationship with reciprocal agent.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the framework for mod-
eling reciprocal altruism and presents its general analysis, leading to the bench-
mark results. Section 3 applies the reciprocal altruism framework to develop
models of interaction in two well-known lab experiments - the Trust Game with
a possibility of a fine by Fehr and Rockenbach [2003] and the ”Control Game” by
Falk and Kosfeld [2006]. Section 4 develops a model of contracting with intrinsic
incentives, based on reciprocal altruism only, without any extrinsic incentives
and considers some applications of such contracting. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Reciprocal Altruism Framework
Consider a Principal-Agent relationship The Principal is altruistic towards the
Agent and the Agent reciprocates the employer’s altruism: if the Agent perceives
the Principal to care about him, he becomes altruistic towards the Principal.
The Principal offers a contract to the Agent.
Output is equal to effort, is observable and verifiable (can be contracted
upon), so that there is no moral hazard.
Producing output is costly for the Agent. The cost function 퐶(푞) satisfies
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standard assumptions - convexity and zero cost at zero output:
퐶′(푞) > 0, 퐶′′(푞) > 0 for 푞 > 0
퐶(0) = 0, 퐶′(0) = 0
Let 퐵 be the Agent’s exogenous benefit from interacting with the Principal5.
The benefit can be psychological or a monetary payment from a third party6.
For now, assume that the Agent doesn’t respond to monetary incentives,
beyond some subsistence level, that we normalize to zero. The selfish utilities
of the Principal and the Agent are then given by
푣 = 푞
푢 = 퐵 − 퐶(푞)
Let 훼 be the degree of the Principal’s altruism and 훼ˆ denote the Agent’s
perception of the Principal’s altruism. Let 훽 denote the intensity of the Agent’s
reciprocity (more generally, it can be treated as intensity of intrinsic motiva-
tion of any nature emerging from perceiving the Principal as ”generous”). The
interaction term 훼ˆ훽 represents the Agent’s altruism emerging as a result of
reciprocating altruism of the Principal.
Assume that 훼 ∈ [훼1, 훼2] ⊆ [0, 1] and 훽훼2 ≤ 1. The assumptions mean that
the Principal’s and the Agent’s altruism is less than 1, in other words the actors
care about own material gain more than about the other’s.
The utilities of the Principal and the Agent when the Agent produces output
푞 are given by
푉 (푞, 훼) = 푣 + 훼푢 = 푞 + 훼(퐵 − 퐶(푞)) (1)
푈(푞, 훼ˆ, 훽) = 푢+ 훼ˆ훽푣 = 퐵 − 퐶(푞) + 훼ˆ훽푞 (2)
The contract can be a command - ”produce 푞” or can give the Agent some
flexibility - say, ”produce any quantity 푞 ∈ [푞1, 푞2]”.
Notice the difference with the standard Principal-Agent setup. The Princi-
pal’s valuation of the output is not always increasing, now it has an inverted-U
shape: it increases only for small enough values of output and is maximal at
some 푞 = 푞푃 . Similarly, the Agent’s payoff is not always decreasing in output,
and has an inverted-U shape: it decreases only for large enough values and
reaches the maximal value at some 푞퐴.
In what follows, I will refer to 푞푃 and 푞퐴 as the Principal’s and the Agent’s
preferred values of output (or performance). In contrast with the standard
Principal-Agent models, 푞푃 ∕= +∞, 푞퐴 ∕= 0. Principal’s and Agent’s payoffs as
functions of output are depicted in Figure 1.
For 훼 = 훽 = 1 the Principal’s and the Agent’s interests are aligned, 푈(푞) ≡
푉 (푞), because there is full internalization, so that the two curves representing
the Principal’s and the Agent’s utilities in Figure 1 coincide.
For smaller values of 훼 or 훽, i.e. weaker internalization, there is a conflict of
interest like in the standard Principal-Agent setup but this conflict is softened
5More generally, 퐵 can be treated as opportunity cost of interacting with the Principal.
In this case isn’t necessarily positive.
6The latter is the case in the lab experiments which I consider in the paper. The third
party will be an experimenter.
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Figure 1: Principal’s and Agent’s payoffs under reciprocal altruism.
by the partial internalization of utilities. In the graph, the two inverted-U curves
become more distant, and consequently, the distance between the maximizers
of the Principal’s and Agent’s utilities 푞푃 and 푞퐴 becomes larger: the Principal
wants the Agent to exert more effort, whereas the Agent prefers performing less.
For an arbitrary 훼ˆ denote the value of 푞, making the participation con-
straint binding, by 푞0(훼ˆ훽). I will refer to this value as the Agent’s participation
threshold.
For 훼ˆ훽 close to 1 the Agent’s participation constraint is not binding because
푞푃 is ”close enough” to the maximizer of the Agent’s utility 푞퐴, where the
Agent’s utility is positive, and then, the Principal can implement her preferred
output 푞푃 . However, as 훼 or 훼ˆ훽 decrease, the participation constraint becomes
binding.
For specific applications of the reciprocal altruism framework, I will make
additional assumption on the distributions of the Principal’s and Agent’s charac-
teristics 훼 and 훽 and on the information structure. The details will be provided
below.
2.1 Benchmark cases
The preferred output value for the Principal is given by
푞푃 (훼) = argmax
푞
[푉 (푞, 훼)] = argmax
푞
[푞 − 훼퐶(푞)]
or
퐶′(푞푃 ) =
1
훼
(3)
If there are no barriers to implementing this output level, such as Agent’s par-
ticipation constraint or limits on contract design, the Principal will induce it.
Lemma 1. The Principal’s preferred output 푞푃 (훼) is determined by (3) and is
a decreasing function of 훼: ∂푞
푃
∂훼
< 0.
The lemma follows directly from (3).
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The preferred value of output for the Agent is given by
푞퐴(훼ˆ훽) = argmax
푞
[푈(푞; 훼ˆ, 훽)] = argmax
푞
[훼ˆ훽푞 − 퐶(푞)]
or
퐶′(푞퐴) = 훼ˆ훽 (4)
This output obtains when the Agent is given full flexibility or, more generally,
if this level is available to the Agent despite some restrictions, such as binding
contract, are imposed.
The Agent is willing to perform at an effort level such that his marginal
cost is equal to his marginal benefit 훼ˆ훽. This means that 훼ˆ훽 is a measure of
the Agent’s intrinsic motivation, similarly to the monetary (extrinsic) incentives
intensity.
Lemma 2. The Agent’s preferred output is determined by an increasing function
푞퐴(훼ˆ훽), determined by (4).
The lemma follows directly from (4).
For the case 훼 < 1 and 훼ˆ훽 < 1 it’s easy to see from (3) that 퐶′(푞푃 ) > 1,
whereas (4) leads to 퐶′(푞퐴) < 1, so that 푞푃 > 푞퐴 and there is always a gap
between the Principal’s and the Agent’s preferred output levels. This gap is
larger, the smaller 훼, 훼ˆ and 훽.
Lemma 3. The Principal’s preferred output is always larger than the Agent’s
preferred output, except when it is a common knowledge that 훼 = 훽 = 1, in
which case the preferred outputs are the same:
푞푃 (훼) > 푞퐴(훼ˆ훽) unless 훼 = 훼ˆ = 1, 훽 = 1
푞푃 (1) = 푞퐴(1)
For the case of symmetric or revealed information, so that 훼ˆ = 훼, the gap 푞푃−푞퐴
between the Principal’s and the Agent’s preferred outputs is a decreasing function
of 훼, 훽:
∂(푞푃−푞퐴)
∂훼
< 0,
∂(푞푃−푞퐴)
∂훽
< 0
The Agent’s participation threshold 푞0(훼ˆ훽) is the unique root of the equation
푈(푞; 훼ˆ, 훽) = 퐵 + 훼ˆ훽푞 − 퐶(푞) = 0 (5)
This leads to the following Lemma.
Lemma 4. The Agent’s participation threshold is given by an increasing func-
tion 푞0(훼ˆ, 훽).
The proof of Lemma 4 is given in the Appendix.
3 Reciprocal Altruism and Contracts
In this section I build variants of the reciprocal altruism framework so as to
account for the behavior observed in the two well-known lab experiments - the
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Trust Game of Fehr and Rockenbach [2003] and the Control Game7 by Falk and
Kosfeld [2006], which are described in detail below.
Under the selfish players assumption, the results of the experiments are
puzzling whereas the reciprocal altruism framework allows to account for the
actually observed behavior, for instance, the motivation crowding out. This
also shows the potential of the modeling approach based on reciprocal altruism
and provides an additional justification for the relevance of contracting models
based on it.
3.1 The Trust Game
Consider the Trust Game (or Investment Game) in its Fehr and Rockenbach
[2003] version. In their experiment, both the Principal and the Agent are en-
dowed with 푆 = 10 units of money. First, the Principal decides on 푥 - how much
money to send to the Agent and also announces 푞ˆ - the desired back-transfer.
The desired back-transfer isn’t binding for the Agent. The experimenter triples
the sum of money sent by the Principal8, so that the Agent receives 3푥. The
Agent then decides on the back-transfer 푞. This setting represents the Baseline
treatment. Notice that 푞ˆ is a ”cheap talk” in this case.
In the Incentive treatment the Principal on top of 푥 and 푞ˆ announces a fine
푓 which is imposed on the Agent if the back-transfer is lower than the desired
level 푞ˆ, so that 푞ˆ is no more ”cheap talk”. The fine isn’t paid to the Principal,
it simply reduces the Agent’s payoff, in other words the fine is a punishment for
the Agent. The fine amount is exogenous (set by the experimenter), so that the
only decision of the Principal is to choose whether to impose the fine or not.
The contract is now (푥, 푞ˆ, 푓) where 푓 can take only two values 0 or 푓 .
The paper brings evidence of crowding-out, i.e. the use of the extrinsic
motivator (fine for bad performance) decreases the intrinsic motivation and, as
a result, leads to a lower performance. The study finds that, on average, in the
incentive treatment the back-payment is higher when the fine is set to zero (the
Principal chooses not to punish) than for the case of punishing (푓 = 푓). This
means that imposing an extrinsic incentive leads to a lower performance.
The utilities of the Principal and the Agent in the experimental setting are
given, following the reciprocal altruism framework9 by
푉 = 10− 푥+ 푞 + 훼(10 + 3푥− 퐶(푞) − 푓퐼푞<푞ˆ)
푈 = 10 + 3푥− 퐶(푞)− 푓퐼푞<푞ˆ + 훼ˆ훽 (10− 푥+ 푞)
Suppose that the decision on 푥 has already been made and focus on the
continuation subgame10 in which the Principal decides on 푞ˆ and 푓 and then the
7I follow Ellingsen and Johannesson [2008] in calling the game of Falk and Kosfeld [2006]
the ”Control Game”.
8This explains why the game can also be called the ”Investment Game”. The transfer 푥
can be thought of as an investment, 3푥 - as a return to the investment.
9In the experiment monetary cost of paying back is linear: 퐶푚(푞) = 푞. I assume that there
is also a psychological cost of paying back 퐶휓(푞) which assumed to be convex, so that the
overall cost 퐶(푞) = 퐶푚(푞) +퐶휓(푞) is convex. This assumption is admittedly ad hoc, but it is
needed to capture the predominance of non bang-bang behavior.
Alternatively, one can assume that Principal’s utility from money is concave with linear cost.
Then, after rescaling utility to linear, cost become convex.
10Of course, 푥 itself is a signal of the Principal’s altruism, but I assume that the Agent
updates his belief on the Principal’s altruism after observing 푥, which brings the belief at the
beginning of the subgame.
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Agent decides on 푞. We can consider 푥 as a constant at this point. Dropping
푥 and other constants in the payoff functions leads to the following simplified
expressions for the payoffs:
푉 = 푞 − 훼(퐶(푞) + 푓퐼푞<푞ˆ) (6)
푈 = 훼ˆ훽푞 − 퐶(푞) − 푓퐼푞<푞ˆ (7)
I specify now the distribution of the Principal’ and the Agent’s characteristics
and information structure of the game.
Let the Principals and the Agents be heterogenous - some of them are
pro-social, others are selfish. I denote the type of the Principal by 휃푃 , and
the type of the Agent by 휃퐴. For both - the Principals and the Agents,
휃푗 ∈ {Social, Selfish}. The type is the private information.
The pro-social actors are characterized by altruism 훼퐻 and reciprocity in-
tensity 훽퐻 , the selfish ones - by the pair (훼퐿, 훽퐿), where
훼퐻 > 훼퐿, 훽퐻 > 훽퐿, 0 ≤ 훼푗 ≤ 1, 훼퐻훽퐻 ≤ 1
To simplify the analysis, I assume11 that 훽퐿 = 0.
Players (Principals and Agents) are drawn from the same population. The
share of the pro-social actors is not known, but the actors have some beliefs
about the population composition. Players rationally believe that the others
in the society (or population) are like themselves, i.e. they exhibit rational
projection bias12 (i.e. consistent with Bayes rule). Loewenstein et al. [2003]
provide evidence for the existence of projection bias and develop a formal model.
Be´nabou and Tirole [2006b] discuss the implication of the projection bias for
collective beliefs.
Denote by 휋퐻 the probability, assigned by the pro-social Principal to being
matched with the pro-social Agent and by 휋퐿 the probability, assigned to the
same event by the selfish Principal:
휋퐻 = 푃푟표푏(휃
퐴 = Social∣휃푃 = Social) = 푃푟표푏(훽 = 훽퐻 ∣훼 = 훼퐻) (8)
휋퐿 = 푃푟표푏(휃
퐴 = Social∣휃푃 = Selfish) = 푃푟표푏(훽 = 훽퐻 ∣훼 = 훼퐿) (9)
According to the rational projection bias, assume that
휋퐿 < 휋 < 휋퐻
where 휋 is the true share of the pro-social actors.
Notice that the Principal moves first and doesn’t know the type of the Agent
with whom she is matched. The Agent, on the contrary, observes the action of
the Principal, and can use this to learn about the Principal’s type. Because of
this, I suppose that behavior of the Principal is driven by her (unconditional)
altruism13, whereas the behavior of the Agent is driven by his reciprocity, which
11The more general setting with the four possible pairs (훼푘 , 훽푙) and without requiring
훽퐿 = 0 can be considered. This, however, leads to more tedious computations but doesn’t
bring additional intuition. So, I restrict attention to the simpler setting.
12The rational projection bias can be determined as ”tendency to look at others (other
people or future selves) from the point of view of one’s current self” - see Tirole [2002].
13Alternatively, one can assume that given the prior belief on the Agent’s altruism, the
Principal’s altruism is equal to the sum of her pure (unconditional) altruism 훼푝 and reciprocal
altruism 훼푟 = 훽푃퐸[훼
퐴]. This results in the Principal’s altruism towards the Agent at the
level 훼퐻 = 훼푝퐻 +훽퐻퐸[훼
퐴] or 훼퐿 = 훼푝퐿+훽퐿퐸[훼
퐴], depending on the type of the Principal.
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is reflected by the structure of altruism in the utility functions 푉 and 푈 in (6)
and (7): only altruism 훼 affects the Principal’s behavior, and only reciprocity
intensity 훽, interacted with the belief on the Principal’s type 훼ˆ - affects the
Agent.
This setting brings us to the following signaling game with two-sided asym-
metric information.
The Principal is of type 휃푃 ∈ {Social, Selfish}, or, equivalently, 훼 ∈ {훼퐻 , 훼퐿}.
The Agent is of type 휃퐴 ∈ {Social, Selfish}, or, equivalently, 훽 ∈ {훽퐻 , 훽퐿}. Each
player’s type is his/her private information.
To make notation simpler, I will write in what follows that the Principal is
of type 푖 = 퐻 (푖 = 퐿) when 휃푃 = 푆표푐푖푎푙 (휃푃 = 푆푒푙푓푖푠ℎ), which is equivalent to
훼 = 훼퐻 (훼 = 훼퐿). Similar convention will be used for the type 푗 of the Agent.
The Principal’s strategy is a type-contingent pair (푓푖, 푞ˆ푖) ∈ {0, 푓}× [0,+∞),
푖 = 퐿,퐻 (where the index 퐿 is used for the selfish type, and 퐻 indexes for the
pro-social type).
The Agent’s strategy is a type-contingent back-transfer conditional on the
Principal’s action 푞푗(푓, 푞ˆ) where 푞푗 ∈ [0,+∞), 푗 = 퐿,퐻 .
The Principal has belief on the probabilities to be matched with the pro-
social Agent, dependent on the Principal’s type: 휋퐻 or 휋퐿.
The Agent’s ex-post belief 휇 is determined by the Principal’s observed action,
휇(푓, 푞ˆ) = 푃푟표푏(푖 = 퐻 ∣푓, 푞ˆ). There is a one-to-one correspondence between belief
휇 and the ex-post expectation of the Principal’s type 훼ˆ: 훼ˆ = 휇훼퐻 + (1− 휇)훼퐿,
so that 훼ˆ can be considered instead of 휇. The payoffs are given by (6) and (7).
The solution concept is the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in which Agent’s
belief off the equilibrium path are ”reasonable”, in the sense of the intuitive
criterion of Cho and Kreps.
The game described above corresponds to the Incentive Treatment. For the
Baseline Treatment the fine 푓 is exogenously set to zero.
I now proceed backwards in the analysis of the game.
Consider the Agent’s Best Response back-transfer for the different treat-
ments of the experiment. The Agent’s participation threshold isn’t relevant,
since paying back zero is feasible.
Claim 1. In the Trust Game, if the Agent holds beliefs 훼ˆ on the Principal’s
altruism, the Best Response back-transfer 푞 is:
1. in the baseline treatment (fine isn’t possible) and in the incentive treatment
when the Principal chooses not to punish (푓 = 0): 푞 = 푞퐴(훼ˆ훽).
2. in the incentive treatment when the Principal chooses to impose a fine
(푓 = 푓):
푞 =
⎧⎨⎩
푞퐴(훼ˆ훽) if 푞ˆ < 푞퐴(훼ˆ훽)
푞ˆ if 푞퐴(훼ˆ, 훽) < 푞ˆ < 푞˜퐴(훼ˆ, 훽)
푞퐴(훼ˆ훽) if 푞ˆ > 푞˜퐴(훼ˆ훽)
where 푞˜퐴(훼ˆ훽) is determined by (see figure 2)
훼ˆ훽푞퐴 − 퐶(푞퐴)− 푓 = 훼ˆ훽푞˜퐴 − 퐶(푞˜퐴), and 푞˜퐴 > 푞퐴
and 푞˜퐴(훼ˆ, 훽) is an increasing function of 훼ˆ.
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Figure 3: Back-transfer as a function of threshold
The proof of Claim 1 is given in the Appendix.
The value 푞˜퐴(훼ˆ훽) can be interpreted as the maximal performance level,
which can be implemented when extrinsic incentives are provided to the in-
trinsically motivated Agent, whereas 푞퐴(훼ˆ훽) is the maximal value which can
be implemented with intrinsic motivation only. For a given belief 훼ˆ holds
푞˜퐴(훼ˆ훽) > 푞퐴(훼ˆ훽), and so under symmetric (or revealed) information, if an
extrinsic incentive is added to intrinsic motivation, the performance level is
higher. So, the fine serves as a ”positive reinforcer”.
When the threat of the fine is imposed, the Agent has to give up some utility
and faces a trade-off between complying and departing from his preferred back-
payment 푞퐴 by selecting the desired back-payment 푞ˆ and paying a fine and
sticking with his preferred back-payment 푞퐴. The value 푞˜퐴 determines the
Agent’s preferred option: if the desired back-payment is below this value, the
Agent prefers to diverge from 푞퐴 to 푞ˆ, if the desired back-transfer is higher
than 푞˜퐴, the Agent prefers to disobey and pay the fine. So, 푞 > 푞˜퐴 can’t be
implemented with a threat of fine.
It follows from the Claim that, contrary to the standard contract theory,
when extrinsic incentives are used for the intrinsically motivated Agent, the
11
actual back transfer can be higher, equal or lower than the desirable back-
transfer, as illustrated by Figure 3.
If 푞ˆ < 푞퐴, the required performance is low compared to the intrinsic motiva-
tion, so the Agent is willing to perform better than he is asked for. For 푞ˆ = 푞퐴
the intrinsic motivation is just enough to motivate the Agent for the required
level of performance. Finally, 푞ˆ > 푞퐴 corresponds to the case when intrinsic
motivation isn’t enough to inspire the Agent for high enough performance.
Before starting the analysis of the Principal’s move, I introduce some nota-
tion.
Denote by
푞푖푗 = 푞
퐴(훼푖, 훽푗)
the maximal back-transfer which can be implemented by using intrinsic mo-
tivation only, given that the Agent with 훽 = 훽푗 holds belief 훼ˆ = 훼푖. These
back-transfers are determined by 퐶′(푞푖푗) = 훼푖훽푗 . Since 훽퐿 = 0,
푞퐻퐿 = 푞퐿퐿 = 0
Denote by
푞˜푖푗 = 푞˜
퐴(훼푖, 훽푗)
the maximal back-transfer which can be implemented by using both intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation, i.e. by imposing the (threat of) fine, given that the
Agent with 훽 = 훽푗 holds belief 훼ˆ = 훼푖. It follows from Claim 1 that
퐶(푞˜퐿퐿) = 푓 (10)
I now show that under some restrictions on the parameters, the game has
the separating equilibrium with crowding-out.
Proposition 1. Assume that 푞퐿퐻 ≤ 푞˜퐿퐿.
If
푞˜퐿퐻 ≤ 푞퐻퐻 , 휋퐻 ≥ 휋ˆ퐻 , 휋퐿 ≤ 휋ˆ퐿 (11)
where
휋ˆ퐻 =
푞˜퐿퐿 − 훼퐻퐶(푞˜퐿퐿)
푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐻퐶(푞퐻퐻 )
≤ 1 (12)
휋ˆ퐿 =
푞˜퐿퐿 − 훼퐿퐶(푞˜퐿퐿)
푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞퐻퐻 )
≥ 0 (13)
then there exists unique equilibrium satisfying the Cho-Kreps intuitive crite-
rion. The equilibrium is separating and has the crowding-out property.
The conditions (11) are also necessary for the existence of the crowding-out
equilibrium.
In this equilibrium the 훼퐻-type imposes no (threat of a) fine, the 훼퐿-type
threatens a fine:
푓∗퐿 = 푓, 푓
∗
퐻 = 0
The desired back-transfers are: 푞ˆ∗퐿 = 푞˜퐿퐿, any 푞ˆ
∗
퐻 ≤ 푞퐻퐻 .
In particular, it is possible to have
푞ˆ∗퐿 > 푞ˆ
∗
퐻
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The actual back-transfers are
푞∗퐿퐿 = 푞˜퐿퐿, 푞
∗
퐿퐻 = 푞˜퐿퐿, 푞
∗
퐻퐿 = 0, 푞
∗
퐻퐻 = 푞퐻퐻
where 푞∗푖푗 is the equilibrium back-transfer to the 훼푖-Principal from the 훽푗-Agent.
The average back-transfer to the pro-social Principal is higher than that to
the selfish one:
휋푞∗퐻퐻 ≥ 푞
∗
퐿퐿
The Proof of Proposition 1 is given in the Appendix.
The assumption 푞퐿퐻 ≤ 푞˜퐿퐿 means that when the selfish Principal controls,
revealing his type in this way, both types of Agents exert the minimal effort
푞˜퐿퐿. Were the inequality 푞퐿퐻 ≤ 푞˜퐿퐿 to be reversed, the pro-social Agent would
exert effort 푞퐿퐻 when controlled. In this case the proposition still holds with
the thresholds 휋ˆ푗 determined by other (more complicated) formulae.
The condition 푞˜퐿퐻 ≤ 푞퐻퐻 is crucial to guarantee crowding-out. In fact, were
it be violated, the separating equilibrium could still emerge, in which case14 the
selfish Principal controls at level 푞˜퐿퐻 and obtains this effort from the pro-social
Agent. Since the pro-social Principal obtains the lower effort 푞퐻퐻 from the pro-
social Agent, the average performance for her is lower compared to the selfish
Principal (the selfish Agents exert zero effort in both cases - whether they are
controlled or not). Finally, the conditions on beliefs 휋푗 are equivalent to the
incentive compatibility constraints for a separating equilibrium.
To guarantee that (12) and (13) in Proposition 1 hold, the sorting condition
is required. For a given setting it can be written as
휋퐻푉퐻(푞푇 )− 푉퐻(푞푃 ) ≥ 휋퐿푉퐿(푞푇 )− 푉퐿(푞푃 ) (14)
for all 푞푃 ≤ 푞푇 ≤ 푄, where 푉푖(푞) = 푉 (푞, 훼푖), 푞푃 stands for performance,
realized when the Principal chooses to ”punish”, i.e. 푓 = 푓 , 푞푇 stands for
performance, realized when the Principal chooses to ”trust”, i.e. 푓 = 0. The
cut-off 푄 = max{푞퐻퐻 , 푞˜퐿퐻} is needed because the utility function 푉 is non-
monotone.
The sorting condition says that when the pro-social Principal prefers to
punish, the selfish one prefers to punish even stronger. Whereas, if the selfish
Principal prefers to trust, the pro-social one prefers to trust to a larger degree.
The proposition makes it clear that the emerging separating equilibrium in
the signaling game accounts for the behavioral patterns observed in the exper-
iment. Intuitively, the pro-social Principal chooses not to impose the fine, i.e.
not to use the extrinsic incentive, signaling in this way her generosity and in-
spiring high intrinsic motivation of the pro-social Agent, which perform at a
comparatively high level 푞퐻퐻 . If the pro-social Principal is matched with a self-
ish Agent, who is not intrinsically motivated, the performance is zero: 푞퐿퐿 = 0,
since there are no extrinsic incentives.
Imposing the threat of fine (negative ”bonus for bad performance”), i.e. us-
ing the extrinsic incentive, crowds out the intrinsic motivation of the pro-social
Agent because this signals low altruism of the Principal. However, provision
of the extrinsic incentive guarantees performance of all Agents15 at a compara-
tively low level 푞˜퐿퐿. This can lead to the observed crowding out in the Agent’s
14For some values of parameters there can be pooling equilibria.
15The pro-social Agents could perform at the level 푞퐿퐻 , if 푞퐿퐻 > 푞˜퐿퐿. This, however, ruled
out by the Proposition assumption.
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performance: the average for the lottery between 푞퐻퐻 and 푞퐿퐿 = 0 is higher
than 푞˜퐿퐿 for some values of the parameters.
The rational projection bias is crucial to guarantee the no-mimicking (in-
centive compatibility) condition. The Principals have different beliefs on the
Agent’s type, for instance, the pro-social Principal is more optimistic. Because
of this, the pro-social Principal prefers the lottery between high 푞퐻퐻 and zero,
whereas the selfish Principal prefers the comparatively low but sure outcome16
푞˜퐿퐿.
I now turn to a more structured discussion of the conditions for the separat-
ing crowding out equilibrium to emerge. The condition 푞퐿퐻 ≤ 푞˜퐿퐿 is equivalent
to 퐶(푞퐿퐻) ≤ 퐶(푞˜퐿퐿). Since 퐶(푞˜퐿퐿) = 푓 - see (10), this means that 푓 should be
high enough:
푓 ≥ 푓1 ≡ 퐶(푞퐿퐻)
The back-transfer 푞˜퐿퐻 is determined, according to Claim 1 by
훼퐿훽퐻푞퐿퐻 − 퐶(푞퐿퐻)− 푓 = 훼퐿훽퐻 푞˜퐿퐻 − 퐶(푞˜퐿퐻)
where 푞˜퐿퐻 is chosen on the decreasing part of the graph of the function
퐹 (푞) = 훼퐿훽퐻푞 − 퐶(푞) (see Figure 2). Consequently, 푞˜퐿퐻 ≤ 푞퐻퐻 is equivalent
to
훼퐿훽퐻푞퐿퐻 − 퐶(푞퐿퐻)− 푓 ≥ 훼퐿훽퐻푞퐻퐻 − 퐶(푞퐻퐻)
which can be rewritten as
푓 ≤ 푓2 ≡ (훼퐿훽퐻푞퐿퐻 − 퐶(푞퐿퐻))− (훼퐿훽퐻푞퐻퐻 − 퐶(푞퐻퐻 ))
The conditions 휋퐻 ≥ 휋ˆ퐻 and 휋퐿 ≤ 휋ˆ퐿 with the thresholds given by (12) and
(13), show that the projection bias should be large enough to ensure incentive
compatibility.
The following corollary gives the more structured description of the crowding-
out separating equilibrium.
Corollary 1. For a generic triple (훼퐿, 훼퐻 , 훽퐻) and quadratic cost function
퐶(푞) = 푐2푞
2 there always exists a non-empty set of the parameters (휋퐿, 휋퐻 , 푓)
such that there exists a separating equilibrium with crowding-out.
These parameters satisfy to (12) and (13) and the inequality 푓1 ≤ 푓 ≤ 푓2.
If cost isn’t quadratic, the additional condition for a triple (훼퐿, 훼퐻 , 훽퐻)
훼퐿훼퐻훽
2
퐻
(
푞퐿퐻
훼퐿훽퐻
−
푞퐻퐻
훼퐻훽퐻
)
≤ 퐶(푞퐿퐻)
is required to obtain a non-empty of the parameters (휋퐿, 휋퐻 , 푓), leading to a
separating equilibrium with crowding-out.
16This reasoning can also be applied if the Principals and the Agents are drawn from two
independent distributions, so that there is no projection bias, but the Principals are risk-averse.
In this case, for the lottery between 푉 (푞퐻퐻) and 푉 (0) the 훼퐿-type has a higher spread, since
푉퐿(푞퐻퐻 ) > 푉퐻 (푞퐻퐻) and 푉퐿(0) < 푉퐻 (0) (in the separating equilibrium 푉퐿(0) = −훼퐿푓 ,
푉퐻 (0) = 0). Because of this, for some range of parameters, the certain outcome 푉퐿(푞˜퐿퐿) is
better than the certainty equivalent of the lottery for the 훼퐿-type, but below the certainty
equivalent for the 훼퐻 -type. So, the separating equilibrium with crowding-out can also emerge
in such setting.
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The Proof of Corollary 1 is given in the Appendix.
The Corollary describes a set of parameters, under which the sorting con-
dition (14) holds. It stays, for instance, that the available extrinsic incentive 푓
should not be neither too weak neither too strong for the separating equilibrium
with crowding-out to appear. Intuitively, if the available extrinsic motivator is
too weak and its use reveals the selfish type, the Agent’s intrinsic motivation
is crowded-out, whereas extrinsic incentives is weak, which leads to a low per-
formance. Because of this, such outcome can’t be an equilibrium, as selfish
Principal prefers not to reveal her type. On the other hand, if the available
extrinsic motivator is too strong, the pro-social Principal prefers to use it, since
it overcomes the decrease in intrinsic motivation, and pooling with threat of
punishment becomes an equilibrium outcome.
3.2 The Control Game
In the experiment conducted in Falk and Kosfeld [2006] the Principal chooses
whether to restrict the set of Agent’s effort from below. Output is again equal
to effort.
Put formally, the Principal offers a contract 푞 which can take two values -
0 or 푞푐, where the latter is exogenously set by the experimenter. The Agent
then chooses effort 푞 ∈ [푞,∞). Effort is costly for the Agent. The Agent has an
initial endowment of 120.
The experiment has a number of findings which can not be explained within
the selfishness framework. For instance, the Agents, when offered a contract
푞 > 0, exert, on average, less effort, than when offered 푞 = 0, which means
that extrinsic incentive (control) has a negative impact on Agents’ performance.
This demonstrates a hidden cost of control effect. The observed behavior of the
Agents is heterogenous: there is observed positive, negative and neutral reaction
to control. Finally, many Principals choose not to control.
The reciprocal altruism framework accounts for these experimental findings.
As for the Trust Game, I use the reciprocal altruism framework and build a
model matching the experiment design.
The selfish utilities of the Principal and the Agent are given by17
푣 = 푞
푢 = 120− 퐶(푞)
The reciprocal altruism framework leads to the (social) utilities
푉 = 푞 + 훼(120− 퐶(푞))
푈 = 120− 퐶(푞) + 훼ˆ훽푞
The initial endowment of the Agent allows to disregard the Agent’s par-
ticipation constraint. By dropping the constants, the Principal’s and Agent’s
utilities can be simplified to
푉 = 푞 − 훼퐶(푞) (15)
푈 = 훼ˆ훽푞 − 퐶(푞) (16)
17The experiment sets 퐶(푞) = 푞/2. As for the Trust Game, I assume that 퐶(푞) is convex.
See footnote 9 for the justification of the assumption.
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Denote by 푞퐴(훼ˆ훽) the Agent’s preferred effort level as in the benchmark case
- see (4).
Consider the setting with heterogenous Principals and Agents, adopted in
the analysis of the Trust Game in subsection 3.1.
The Principal’s strategy is a type-contingent choice of control 푞
푖
∈ {0, 푞푐},
푖 = 퐿,퐻 . The Agent’s strategy is a type-contingent effort, conditional on the
Principal’s action 푞푗(푞) ∈ [푞,+∞), 푗 = 퐿,퐻 .
The Principal’s belief on the probabilities to be matched with the pro-social
Agent depends on the Principal’s type and are given by (8) and (9). The
Agent’s ex-post beliefs are determined by the Principal’s observed action, 휇(푞) =
푃푟표푏(훼 = 훼퐻 ∣푞). There is a one-to-one correspondence between belief 휇 and
the ex-post expectation of the Principal’s type 훼ˆ: 훼ˆ = 휇훼퐻 +(1−휇)훼퐿, so that
훼ˆ can be considered instead of 휇. The payoffs are given by (15) and (16).
As in the analysis of the Trust game, I look for a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in which Agent’s beliefs off the equilibrium path are ”reasonable” in the sense
of the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps.
I proceed backwards in the analysis of the game.
Consider first the Agent’s Best Response choice of effort.
Claim 2. If 푞퐴(훼ˆ, 훽) ≥ 푞 then the Agent’s Best Response is 푞 = 푞퐴(훼ˆ, 훽);
otherwise it is 푞 = 푞.
The Claim is evident as it simply says that the Agent chooses the global
maximizer of his utility whenever it’s feasible. Otherwise, he chooses the closest
feasible effort which is equal to 푞 - the lower bound of the set of feasible efforts.
Denote by 푞푖푗 the effort, voluntarily exerted by the Agent with 훽푗 which
beliefs that the Principal’s type is 훼푖, i.e. 푞푖푗 = 푞
퐴(훼푖, 훽푗) and 퐶
′(푞푖푗) = 훼푖훽푗 .
Consider now the Principal’s decision. If the Principal with altruism 훼푖 holds
beliefs 휋푖 to be matched with a pro-social Agent, who, in turn, holds the true
beliefs about the Principal’s type, then under no-control, the Principal’s utility
is18
푉 = 휋푖(푞푖퐻 − 훼푖퐶(푞푖퐻)) (17)
Under control, if effort 푞푖퐻 is available, i.e. 푞푖퐻 ≥ 푞푐, and the Principal’s
utility is still given by (17). If 푞푖퐻 < 푞푐, then the effort 푞 = 푞푐 is implemented
and the Principal’s utility is
푉 = (푞푐 − 훼푖퐶(푞푐)) (18)
Denote by 푞퐶1푖 < 푞
퐶2
푖 the two roots of the equation (see Figure 4)
휋푖(푞푖퐻 − 훼푖퐶(푞푖퐻)) = (푞푐 − 훼푖퐶(푞푐))
Comparing the Principal’s utility for the case when the Agent holds the true
beliefs on the Principal’s type, given by (17) and (18), leads to the following
characterization of the Principal’s Best Response in this case:
Claim 3. Under symmetric information about the Principal’s type, the type 훼푖
-Principal’s optimal strategy is:
푞 =
{
푞푐 if 푞푐 ≤ 푞
퐶2
푖
0 if 푞푐 ≥ 푞
퐶2
푖
18푞푖퐿 = 0 since 훽퐿 = 0.
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Figure 4: Principal’s utility
Consider now the case when the Principal’s type is her private information.
Proposition 2. For each 푞푐 < 푞퐻퐻 , (훼퐿, 훼퐻 , 훽퐻) there exists a range of pa-
rameters (휋퐿, 휋퐻) such that there exists a unique separating equilibrium of the
Control Game satisfying the intuitive criterion. There is crowding-out in effort
in equilibrium.
The parameters should be such that
휋퐿 ≤ 휋ˆ퐿, 휋퐻 ≥ 휋ˆ퐻
where for the case 푞푐 ≥ 푞퐿퐻
휋ˆ퐿 =
푞푐 − 훼퐿퐶(푞푐)
푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞퐻퐻 )
> 0
휋ˆ퐻 =
푞푐 − 훼퐻퐶(푞푐)
푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐻퐶(푞퐻퐻 )
< 1
for the case 푞푐 < 푞퐿퐻
휋ˆ퐿 =
푞푐 − 훼퐿퐶(푞푐)
[푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞퐻퐻)] + [푞푐 − 훼퐿퐶(푞푐)]− [푞퐿퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞퐿퐻)]
> 0
휋ˆ퐻 =
푞푐 − 훼퐻퐶(푞푐)
[푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐻퐶(푞퐻퐻)] + [푞푐 − 훼퐻퐶(푞푐)]− [푞퐿퐻 − 훼퐻퐶(푞퐿퐻)]
< 1
In equilibrium, the pro-social Principal doesn’t control, whereas the selfish
Principal does:
푞∗
퐻
= 0, 푞∗
퐿
= 푞푐
The Agent’s performance
푞∗퐻퐻 = 푞퐻퐻 , 푞
∗
퐻퐿 = 0, 푞
∗
퐿퐻 = max{푞퐿퐻 , 푞푐}, 푞
∗
퐿퐿 = 푞푐
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where 푞∗푖푗 is the equilibrium back-transfer to the 훼푖-Principal from the 훽푗-Agent.
The average effort to the pro-social Principal is higher than that to the selfish
one.
The Proof of Proposition 2 is given in the Appendix.
As for the Trust Game, the sorting condition, similar to (14) is required. It
is written as
휋퐻푉퐻(푞푇 )− 푉퐻(푞푐) > 휋퐿푉퐿(푞푇 )− 푉퐿(푞푐) (19)
for the case of 푞푐 ≥ 푞퐿퐻 , and
휋퐻푉퐻(푞푇 )−[휋퐻푉퐻(푞푐)+(1−휋퐻)푉퐻(푞퐿퐻)] > 휋퐿푉퐿(푞푇 )−[휋퐿푉퐿(푞푐)+(1−휋퐿)푉퐻(푞퐿퐻)]
(20)
for the case of 푞푐 < 푞퐿퐻 .
Since the Principal has only binary choice - to control or to trust, the sorting
condition should be verified only for 푞푇 = 푞퐻퐻 (an outcome 푞푐 or a lottery
between 푞푐 and 푞퐿퐻 correspond to a (variable) outcome 푞푃 in (14)).
The mechanism of emerging of the separating equilibrium with crowding-out
is similar to that of the Trust Game. By choosing not to control, the pro-social
Principal signals her kindness, and this inspires high intrinsic motivation for the
pro-social Agent. Because of this, when matched with the pro-social Principal,
the pro-social Agent exerts high effort 푞퐻퐻 . However, the selfish Agent doesn’t
react to the signal of the Principal’s generosity and, once not controlled, exerts
zero effort.
The selfish Principal chooses to control and guarantees the (comparatively
low) output 푞푐. However, even selfish Principal inspires the pro-social Agent’s
intrinsic motivation, so effort from the pro-social Agent can be 푞퐿퐻 , if it’s higher
than the controlling threshold 푞푐.
The lottery between 푞퐻퐻 and 0 effort is differently treated by the two Prin-
cipals. The pro-social one is more optimistic, and beliefs that the chance to get
푞퐻퐻 is higher, compared to the beliefs of the selfish Principal. Because of this,
no-mimicking holds - the pro-social Principal prefers the lottery, whereas the
selfish Principal prefers the sure outcome.
As in the Trust Game, the separating crowding-out equilibrium emerges
when the available extrinsic incentive is neither too weak nor too strong.
I now turn to the more detailed description of other equilibrium structures
of the Control Game.
Proposition 3. For given 훼퐿, 훼퐻 , 훽퐻 , 휋퐿, 휋퐻 , there exist the threshold values
푞푖, 푞푖 < 푞푗 for 푖 < 푗, such that the equilibrium in the Control Game is:
1. No-control pooling for 푞푐 ∈ [0, 푞1], which represents no effect of control;
2. Separating equilibrium with crowding-out for 푞푐 ∈ [푞2, 푞3] (hidden cost of
control);
3. Control pooling for 푞푐 ∈ [푞3, 푞4] (positive effect of control);
4. Separating with no crowding-out in effort 푞푐 ∈ [푞4, 푞5] (positive effect of
control);
5. No-control pooling 푞푐 ∈ [푞6,+∞).
For 푞푐 ∈ [푞1, 푞2] and 푞푐 ∈ [푞5, 푞6] an equilibrium involves mixed strategies.
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The Proof of Proposition 3 is given in the Appendix.
Figure 5 illustrates the proposition.
V
q
q − αLC(q)
q − αHC(q)
piL(qEH − αLC(qEH))
piL([qHH−αLC(qHH)]−[qLH−αLC(qLH)])
1−piL
piH(qHH − αHC(qHH ))
q1q2 q3 q4 q5q6
Figure 5: Equilibrium structure in the Control Game
Falk and Kosfeld [2006] found in the experiment that for small 푞푐 the hidden
cost of control effect is stronger compared to large 푞푐. The model is in line with
this result. In fact, the hidden cost of control is obtained for 푞푐 ∈ [푞2, 푞3]; for
larger 푞푐, the pooling equilibrium with control emerges which means that the
increase in 푞푐 will lead to the increase in average performance (which is equal
to 푞푐). For even larger 푞푐 the separating equilibrium in which the controlling
Principal gets larger output than the non-controlling one, so there is also the
positive effect of control rather than the hidden cost.
The experiment finds strong heterogeneity between the Agents and that
there are Agents which react positively, neutrally or negatively to control. The
heterogeneity of the Agents is assumed in the model, and the reaction of the
Agents is predicted. Controlling the pro-social Agents can lead to the decrease
in his performance. For instance, for 푞푐 ∈ [푞2, 푞3] when the crowding-out equilib-
rium emerges, the controlled pro-social Agent performs at 푞 = 푞푐, whereas the
uncontrolled at 푞 = 푞퐻퐻 > 푞푐. Controlling the selfish Agent leads to the increase
in performance for 푞푐 ∈ [푞2, 푞5]. Controlling the pro-social Agents also leads to
the increase in their performance for the control pooling equilibria. Finally, the
neutral effect of control can emerge in the game but out of equilibrium path.
According to Claim 2, if Agent’s preferred output 푞퐴 is higher than control,
the Agent will perform at level 푞퐴 independently on whether he is controlled or
not. In particular, for the case of weak control (푞푐 is small enough), even if the
pro-social Agent is controlled, he can choose to perform at a higher level.
The experiment finds that for larger 푞푐, the larger share of the Principals
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chooses to control. This is also the prediction of the model: for small 푞푐 none of
the Principals controls which results in the no-control pooling equilibrium; for
larger values of 푞푐 the hidden cost of control equilibrium emerges in which only
the selfish Principals control; for even larger values of 푞푐 the control pooling
equilibrium emerges in which both types of Principal choose to control.
4 Contracts without Extrinsic Incentives
In this section I consider the case when extrinsic incentives are not available
at all. In this case the Agent is motivated to exert effort either through his
intrinsic motivation either because he’s ”forced” to perform by the contract.
In the former case the Agent is happy (gets positive utility), in the latter case
the Agent doesn’t enjoy the interaction with the Principal (i.e. performs at his
participation constraint).
Let the Principal’s altruism parameter 훼 be her private information and the
rest be symmetrically known.
The timing is as follows:
1. Principal learns 훼.
2. Principal offers a contract19: a command, i.e. specifies the output 푞.
3. Agent accepts or rejects the contract.
4. Contract is implemented and payoffs are realized.
So, we have a signaling game with common values.
To simplify the exposition even further, I consider the two-type case and
then generalize the result to the continuum of types case.
Even though the formal setting of the signaling game should be clear for
most of the readers, I provide its formal description in the next subsection and
proceed then to the analysis of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria and refinement.
Readers who are not interested in the technical details can skip the technical
subsection 4.1 and jump to 4.2 where the outcome of the signaling game as
predicted by the refined equilibrium is described.
4.1 Signaling with 2 types
There are 2 players - Principal (sender) and Agent (receiver).
The Principal’s type is her private information. Denote by 풜 the set of the
possible types, 풜 = {훼퐻 , 훼퐿}. The prior distribution is given by
훼 =
{
훼퐻 with prob. Π
훼퐿 with prob. 1−Π
(21)
The set of actions for the Principal20 is 푄 = [0,+∞). The set of actions for
the Agent is 퐴 = [0, 1] with 푎 ∈ 퐴 be the probability of acceptance of an offer
made by the Principal.
19The contract is the take-it-or-leave-it offer.
20Actually, this set of actions can be reduced to [0, 푞0퐻 ].
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A pure strategy of the Principal is a type-contingent 푞 ∈ 푄, i.e. 푞퐻 for 훼퐻
type and 푞퐿 for 훼퐿-type.
A pure strategy of the Agent is an acceptance rule 푎(⋅). The value 푎(푞) ∈
[0, 1] is the probability of accepting the offer 푞. The set of Agent’s pure strategies
ℱ is the set of all mappings from 푄 to [0, 1].
A mixed strategy of the Principal is a probability distribution over 푄 con-
ditional on type, 휎(⋅∣훼). Clearly her mixed strategy can be represented by the
two probability distributions over 푄: (휎퐻(⋅),휎퐿(⋅)).
A mixed strategy of the Agent is a probability distribution21 휏 over ℱ . The
resulting mapping is still a mapping from 푄 to [0, 1]. So, the mixed strategy of
the Agent, denoted by 푎휏 (⋅), is still an element of ℱ . I will will restrict attention
to the pure strategies of the Agent.
The Agent’s ex-post beliefs on the Principal’s type distribution 휇(⋅) is
휇(푞) = 푃푟표푏(훼 = 훼퐻 ∣푞)
There is one-to-one correspondence between Agent’s beliefs 휇(푞) and Agent’s
ex-post expectation on the Principal’s altruism
훼ˆ(푞) = 휇(푞)훼퐻 + (1− 휇(푞))훼퐿 (22)
which is paralleled in the Agent’s ex-post expected payoff22
푈휇(푞, 푎;훽) = 푈(푞, 푎, 훼ˆ;훽)
The pure-strategy profile is thus ((푞퐻 , 푞퐿), 푎(⋅), 휇(⋅)). The mixed strategies-
beliefs profile is ((휎퐻(⋅), 휎퐿(⋅)), 푎(⋅), 휇(⋅)).
The payoffs in the game for the pure-strategy profile ((푞퐿, 푞퐻), 푎(⋅)) are
푉 (푞, 푎(⋅), 훼) = 푉 (푞, 훼)푎(푞) = (푞 − 훼퐶(푞) + 훼퐵)푎(푞)
푈(푞, 푎(⋅), 훼;훽) = 푈(푞, 훼;훽)푎(푞) = (퐵 − 퐶(푞) + 훼훽푞)푎(푞)
which parallel (1) and (2).
The payoffs for the mixed strategies can be determined in a standard way.
Denote by 푞푃퐻 and 푞
푃
퐿 the preferred output of the high and low altruism
Principals, respectively. Formally, 푞푃퐻 = 푞
푃 (훼퐻), 푞
푃
퐿 = 푞
푃 (훼퐿). From lemma 1
we have
푞푃퐻 < 푞
푃
퐿 (23)
Intuitively, the Principal who cares more about the Agent wants him to
work less. Intuitively, since the marginal cost of effort is increasing and the
Principal partially internalizes this cost, the one with stronger internalization
prefers to have a lower marginal cost 퐶′(푞) because marginal benefit from output
is constant (equal to 1).
Denote by 푞0퐻 and 푞
0
퐿 the Agent participation thresholds when he learns that
the Principal type is 훼퐻 and 훼퐿 correspondingly. Formally, 푞
0
퐻 = 푞
0(훼퐻 , 훽),
푞0퐿 = 푞
0(훼퐿, 훽).
Denote the participation threshold when there is no update on the Principal’s
type by 푞0퐸 :
푞0퐸 = 푞
0(퐸훼, 훽)
21There is an issue of measurability over the space of functions.
22It is easy to see that 푈휇(푞, 푎(⋅); 훽) = 휇(푞)(퐵−퐶(푞)+훼퐻훽푞))푎(푞)+(1−휇(푞))(퐵 −퐶(푞)+
훼퐿훽푞))푎(푞) = (퐵 + 훼ˆ훽푞 − 퐶(푞))푎(푞).
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where
퐸훼 = Π훼퐻 + (1−Π)훼퐿
According to Lemma 4,
푞0퐿 < 푞
0
퐸 < 푞
0
퐻 . (24)
Intuitively, if the Principal’s type is revealed to the Agent, then he is willing
to exert more effort for a Principal who cares more about him. This is natu-
ral since the worker internalizes the benefits from output and intensity of the
internalization is higher for the worker connected with more altruistic Principal.
4.1.1 The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
As is standard in signaling games, the set of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
(PBE) is large. In this part of the paper I characterize the structure of the PBE
set and proceed to refinement in section 4.1.2.
Consider a PBE of the signaling game. Denote the equilibrium (pure) offers
of the Principal of type 훼퐻 (훼퐿) by 푞
∗
퐻 (푞
∗
퐿), the equilibrium acceptance rule
of the Agent by 푎∗(⋅). The beliefs supporting the equilibrium is 휇∗(⋅). So, the
pure-strategy equilibrium profile is ((푞∗퐻 , 푞
∗
퐿), 푎
∗(⋅);휇∗(⋅)). Similarly, the mixed-
strategy equilibrium profile is ((휎∗퐻(⋅), 휎
∗
퐿(⋅)), 푎
∗(⋅);휇∗(⋅)).
Denote by 퐵푅휇(푞) the best response acceptance rule for the Agent with
ex-post beliefs 휇(⋅):
퐵푅휇(푞) = argmax
푎∈[0,1]
푈휇(푞, 푎;훽) (25)
Lemma 5. For any beliefs 휇(⋅), the Best Response acceptance rule is a threshold
with the threshold value
푞ˆ(푞) = 푞0(훼ˆ(푞), 훽) (26)
퐵푅휇(푞) =
⎧⎨⎩
1 if 푞 < 푞ˆ(푞)
0 if 푞 > 푞ˆ(푞)
any 푎 ∈ [0, 1] if 푞 = 푞ˆ(푞)
where 훼ˆ(푞) is given by (22)
For any beliefs 휇(⋅) and any offer 푞
푞0퐿 ≤ 푞ˆ(푞) ≤ 푞
0
퐻 (27)
so that for any Best Response acceptance rule, the Agent accepts at least offers
푞 < 푞0퐿 and rejects any offer 푞 > 푞
0
퐻 .
Corollary 2. The equilibrium acceptance rule 푎∗(⋅) is a threshold with threshold
value given by (26)
The Proof of Corollary 2 is given in the Appendix.
I now proceed to the analysis of the Principal’s equilibrium offer. First, I
prove the monotonicity Lemma, which is based on a standard revealed prefer-
ences argument.
Lemma 6. For any 푞∗퐿 ∈ supp 휎
∗
퐿, 푞
∗
퐻 ∈ supp 휎
∗
퐻 holds
퐶(푞∗퐻)푎
∗(푞∗퐻) ≤ 퐶(푞
∗
퐿)푎
∗(푞∗퐿)
푞∗퐻 ≤ 푞
∗
퐿
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The Proof of Lemma 6 is given in the Appendix.
Next, I show that if an equilibrium has a pooling part, it can consist of only
one offer.
Lemma 7. If supp 휎∗퐻 ∩ supp 휎
∗
퐿 ∕= ∅ then there is only one common point in
the supports of the equilibrium mixed strategies for the two types:
supp 휎∗퐻 ∩ supp 휎
∗
퐿 =
{
푞∗푝
}
The Proof of Lemma 7 is given in the Appendix.
The two Lemmas 6 and 7 show that any PBE has a very particular structure:
there can be a pooling part - an offer 푞∗푝 made by both types of the Principal,
and a separating part - the offers made only by 훼퐻 -type lying to the left of 푞
∗
푝,
and the offers made only by 훼퐿-type to the right of 푞
∗
푝. Put formally,
푞∗퐻 < 푞
∗
푝 < 푞
∗
퐿 (28)
for any 푞∗퐻 ∈ supp 휎
∗
퐻 ∖ supp 휎
∗
퐿, 푞
∗
퐿 ∈ supp 휎
∗
퐿 ∖ supp 휎
∗
퐻 if the corresponding
elements of an equilibrium exist and given that 푎∗(푞∗퐻) = 1.
I will distinguish between
∙ pooling equilibria - equilibria with supp 휎∗퐻 = supp 휎
∗
퐿,
∙ semi-separating equilibria23 - equilibria with supp 휎∗퐻 ∕= supp 휎
∗
퐿 and
supp 휎∗퐻 ∩ supp 휎
∗
퐿 ∕= ∅
∙ separating equilibria, for which supp 휎∗퐻 ∩ supp 휎
∗
퐿 = ∅.
For the further analysis the relative position of 푞푃퐻 , 푞
푃
퐿 , 푞
0
퐿, 푞
0
퐸 is important.
It is partially described by (23) and (24). More precise characterization can be
obtained by inspecting Figure 6. The formal statement is as follows.
q
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Figure 6: The relative position of 푞푃퐻 , 푞
푃
퐿 , 푞
0
퐿, 푞
0
퐸
23Semi-separating equilibria are often called ”hybrid” in the literature.
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Proposition 4. There exist thresholds 훽3 < 훽2 < 훽1 determined by
훽1 is solution to 푞
0(훼퐿, 훽) = 푞
푃
퐿
훽2 is solution to 푞
0(훼퐿, 훽) = 푞
푃
퐻
훽3 is solution to 푞
0(퐸훼, 훽) = 푞푃퐻
such that
푞0퐿 < 푞
푃
퐻 for 훽 < 훽2
푞푃퐻 < 푞
0
퐿 for 훽 > 훽2
The thresholds 훽푗 are important to describe the equilibria structure and
properties.
For the analysis of the separating and semi-separating equilibria the crucial
is the relative position of 푞푃퐻 and 푞
0
퐿, i.e. whether 훽 > 훽2 or 훽 < 훽2.
The following lemma characterizes the set of the PBE in the signaling game.
Lemma 8. 1. For 훽 ≤ 훽2 the signaling game has multiple pooling and semi-
separating PBE.
In any pooling equilibria there is only one offer 푞∗푝 made by both Principal
types: supp 휎∗퐻 = supp 휎
∗
퐿 = {푞
∗
푝}.
The offer 푞∗푝 is a pooling equilibrium offer iff 푞
0
퐿 ≤ 푞
∗
푝 ≤ min{푞
0
퐸, 푞
00
퐿 } where
푞00퐿 > 푞
0
퐿 is the solution to 푉 (푞
00
퐿 , 훼퐻) = 푉 (푞
0
퐿, 훼퐻).
In any semi-separating equilibrium there can be one or two offers 푞∗퐻(푞
∗∗
퐻 ) ∈
supp 휎∗퐻 ∖ supp 휎
∗
퐿, made by 훼퐻-type only, and one pooling offer 푞
∗
푝, with the
acceptance probabilities 푎∗(푞∗퐻) = 1, 푎
∗(푞∗푝) ≤ 1; for 훽 ≤ 훽3 there is only one
offer 푞∗퐻 ∈ supp 휎
∗
퐻 ∖ supp 휎
∗
퐿.
2. For 훽 > 훽2 the signaling game has only unique separating PBE. In this
equilibrium 푞∗퐻 = 푞
푃
퐻 , 푞
∗
퐿 = min{푞
0
퐿, 푞
푃
퐿 } and 푞
∗
퐿 > 푞
∗
퐻 .
The Proof of Lemma 8 is given in the Appendix.
Now we have obtained the structure of the set of PBE of the signaling game
in great details.
The multiplicity of equilibria is the consequence of no restrictions on the
acceptance rule for the out-of-equilibrium offers. Equilibrium refinement is a
standard procedure for the signaling games which allows to eliminate ”unrea-
sonable” equilibria.
4.1.2 Equilibrium Refinement
I will now focus on the case 훽 ≤ 훽2, since there are multiple PBE in this
case, whereas for 훽 > 훽2 there is unique PBE
24. I use the intuitive criterion25
proposed by Cho and Kreps [1987]. I’ll show that it eliminates some equilibria
for the case 훽 ≤ 훽2, though there is still a continuum of equilibria satisfying
it. I will argue then that one of them is ”the most reasonable” by applying a
stronger refinement.
Some notation is needed to implement the intuitive criterion, following Cho
and Kreps [1987]. Let 휈(풜′∣푞) be the ex-post probability which the Agent assigns
24It’s easy to show that the separating equilibrium satisfies the intuitive criterion.
25A survey of the refinements procedures and approaches can be found in Fudenberg and
Tirole [1991].
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to the (sub)set 풜′ of the Principal’s type after observing an offer 푞. For the two-
type case 풜′ can be {훼퐻}, {훼퐿} or 풜 = {훼퐻 , 훼퐿}.
Formally,
휈(풜′∣푞) = 휇(푞)퐼{훼퐻∈풜′} + (1− 휇(푞))퐼{훼퐿∈풜′}
Let
퐵푅(풜′, 푞) =
∪
휇: 휈(풜′∣푞)=1
퐵푅휇(푞)
be the set of all reasonable acceptance rules for beliefs concentrated on the
(sub)set 풜′ applied to the offer 푞 would it be proposed. The acceptance rule is
”reasonable” if it is a Best Response corresponding to some beliefs concentrated
on the (sub)set 풜′.
Fix an equilibrium profile ((휎∗퐻(⋅), 휎
∗
퐿(⋅)), 푎
∗(⋅);휇∗(⋅)). Denote the equilib-
rium payoff of 훼푗-type Principal by 푉
∗
푗 = 푉 (푞
∗
푗 , 푎
∗(푞∗푗 ), 훼푗) for some
26 푞∗푗 ∈ supp 휎
∗
푗 .
Let 퐽(푞) be the set of types which for sure don’t want to deviate to 푞 for
any reasonable acceptance rule:
퐽(푞) =
{
훼푗 : 푉
∗
푗 > max
푎∈퐵푅(풜,푞)
푉 (푞, 푎, 훼푗)
}
The set 풜 ∖ 퐽(푞) then is the set of Principal’s types which for sure want to
deviate from an equilibrium and make an offer 푞, provided that some reasonable
acceptance rule will be applied.
The equilibrium satisfies the intuitive criterion if
푉 ∗푗 ≥ min
푎∈퐵푅(풜∖퐽(푞),푞)
푉 (푞, 푎, 훼푗) for all 푗, 푞 (29)
The following Proposition states the main result of the equilibrium refine-
ment of the signaling game.
Proposition 5. For 훽 ≤ 훽2
(
⇔ 푞0퐿 ≤ 푞
푃
퐻
)
only the pooling equilibria with
푞0퐿 ≤ 푞
∗
푝 ≤ 푞
0
퐸
satisfy the intuitive criterion.
The Proof of Proposition 5 is given in the Appendix.
For the case of 훽 ≤ 훽2
(
⇔ 푞0퐿 ≤ 푞
푃
퐻
)
there are still many pooling equilibria,
satisfying the intuitive criterion, though fewer than in the set of PBE and none
of the semiseparating equilibria don’t pass the intuitive criterion. It can be
shown that the pooling equilibria, satisfying the intuitive criterion, can’t be
eliminated by applying Criterion D1 (a version of the divinity equilibrium in
the sense of Fudenberg and Tirole [1991], ch.11) or NWBR criteria.
The reason for the multiplicity of the pooling equilibria, satisfying the in-
tuitive criterion is that the equilibrium payoff for the Principal is compared in
(29) with the worst (for the Principal) reasonable acceptance rule, based on
Agent’s beliefs, concentrated on the set 풜 = {훼퐻 , 훼퐿}. In the worst case, after
observing a deviation to 푞 > 푞∗푝 , the Agent believes that this deviation is done
26Clearly, for any 푞∗푗 ∈ supp 휎
∗
푗 , 푉 (푞
∗
푗 , 푎
∗(푞∗푗 ), 훼푗) takes the same value, so the definition of
푉 ∗푗 is correct.
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by 훼퐿-type. Then, any offer 푞 > 푞
0
퐿 is reasonably rejected and the intuitive
criterion (29) is satisfied for PBE offers 푞∗푝 > 푞
0
퐿, since any upward deviation
from 푞∗푝 is reasonably rejected.
However, once such upward deviation is profitable for both types, the intu-
itive criterion can be strengthened by comparing the equilibrium payoff in (29)
with payoff obtained under ”more reasonable” acceptance rule which is based
on the ex-ante beliefs instead of the worst beliefs. Then, in the right-hand side
of (29) the acceptance rule applied to deviations 푞 > 푞∗퐻퐿 is the Best Response
acceptance rule based on beliefs 휇(푞) = Π, so that any 푞 < 푞0퐸 (not only 푞 < 푞
0
퐿)
is accepted. This rules out all the PBE with 푞 < 푞0퐸 .
For an equilibrium offer 푞∗푝 = 푞
0
퐸 the Agent is indifferent between accepting
and rejecting (and between any probability of accepting), but for the acceptance
rule satisfying the strengthened intuitive criterion, all the offers just below 푞0퐸
are accepted with probability 1, so if 푎∗(푞0퐸) < 1, then there will be profitable
deviation for any Principal to 푞0퐸 − 휀. Consequently, only 푎
∗(푞0퐸) = 1 is possible
in a (refined) equilibrium.
The strengthening of the intuitive criterion in this way is equivalent to re-
quiring the acceptance rule to be sequentially rational on the out-of-equilibrium
path. It is also equivalent to eliminating the weakly dominated acceptance rules.
Finally, the ”non-worth beliefs” intuitive criterion selects in the considered
game the Pareto-dominant pooling equilibrium, which is the equilibrium with
the highest effort.
As a result, only equilibrium with the offer 푞∗푝 = 푞
0
퐸 for 훽 ≤ 훽3 satisfies the
strengthened intuitive criterion. For 훽3 < 훽 < 훽2 the strengthened criterion
also leads to the unique prediction for the game outcome 푞∗푝 = 푞
푃
퐻 . Indeed, this
offer is feasible, and 훼퐻 -type prefers to make it. By deviating to a higher offer,
훼퐿-type would be revealed and then the deviating offer would be rejected, so
훼퐿-type has to pool on 푞
푃
퐻 .
It’s easy to check that the unique separating equilibrium for 훽 > 훽2 which
satisfies the intuitive criterion satisfies the strengthened criterion as well.
4.2 The 2-type Signaling Game Outcome
For the rest of the discussion I call 훼퐿-type the ”tough” Principal and 훼퐻 -type
- the ”generous” Principal. Consider an intuitive explanation for the signaling
game outcome.
When the Agent is highly reciprocal, 훽 ∈ (훽1, 1], he can be easily intrinsically
motivated even by the tough Principal and agrees to perform at her preferred
level 푞푃퐿 , which is quite high, because the Agent’s participation constraint isn’t
very tight. In this case, the tough Principal will reveal her type by requiring
performance at this high level.
However, as the Agent’s reciprocity declines, his intrinsic motivation de-
creases, and the tough Principal can’t inspire the Agent to perform at the level
푞푃퐿 and has to follow the Agent participation constraint by offering contract
with 푞 < 푞푃퐿 , still revealing her type for 훽 ∈ (훽2, 훽1). The Agent gets zero social
utility in this case.
For even lower reciprocity intensity, the Agent’s intrinsic motivation is not
enough to make him exert effort higher than 푞푃퐻 if he would learn that the
Principal is tough. In this case, the tough Principal follows the offer of the
generous Principal, in other words, she has to mimic the generous Principal.
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Figure 7: Equilibrium in the signaling game
The Agent can’t distinguish the two types of the Principal and his participation
threshold becomes being based on the expected value of the Principal altruism
퐸훼 > 훼퐿 so that 푞 = 푞
푃
퐻 breaks even. The generous Principal doesn’t want to
separate since she gets her preferred output 푞푃퐻 . The Agent’s expected utility
is positive. This is the case for 훽 ∈ (훽3, 훽2).
Finally, when the Agent’s reciprocity intensity is very low so that the Agent
doesn’t have enough intrinsic motivation to exert effort 푞푃퐻 , both types of Prin-
cipal follow the Agent’s participation threshold for the expected value of the
Principal’s altruism 퐸훼, not revealing the type. Neither type of the Principal
has an incentive to deviate and reveal his type. This is the case for 훽 ∈ (0, 훽3).
To conclude the description of the outcome, I stress that in the 2-type sig-
naling game the tough Principal doesn’t want to mimic the generous one unless
she has to, because mimicking will result in lower output which is not desirable
for the tough Principal. However, the Agent is (intrinsically) motivated to ac-
cept an offer if it isn’t too high. As a result, if the Agent’s intrinsic motivation
isn’t high enough - due to low intensity of reciprocity or due to revealed low
altruism of the tough Principal, the tough Principal has to follow the Agent’s
participation threshold or the generous Principal’s offer.
4.3 Signaling with Continuum of Types
The analysis for 2 types can be generalized to the case of a continuum of types.
I don’t present the complete analysis, as for the 2-type case and rather focus
on the ”most reasonable” equilibrium27, which leads to the unique prediction of
the signaling game outcome.
Let the Principal’s altruism parameter 훼 be distributed on the interval
[훼1, 훼2] ⊂ [0, 1] with continuous CDF 퐹 (훼).
The interval’s bounds 훼1 and 훼2 are the exact bounds of the distribution:
27See the refinement section for the 2-type case for the discussion of the ”most reasonable”
equilibrium.
27
훼1 = inf{훼∣퐹 (훼) > 0}, 훼2 = sup{훼∣퐹 (훼) < 1}.
Let 훼× be the solution to
푞0
(
훼×, 훽
)
= 푞푃
(
훼×
)
which always exists28 and is unique since the left-hand side is increasing and
the right-hand side is decreasing function of 훼 - see Figure 8.
The next property follows directly from the definition of 훼×.
Claim 4. The Principal’s preferred output 푞푃 is feasible, i.e. satisfies the
Agent’s participation constraint iff 훼 ≥ 훼×.
So, the population of the Principals can be separated into two sub-populations.
One consists of comparatively generous ones with 훼 ≥ 훼×, which can inspire the
Agent’s intrinsic motivation high enough to implement their preferred output
푞푃 , would their altruism be revealed. Another subpopulation consists of com-
paratively tough Principals with 훼 < 훼×, which can not inspire high enough
Agent’s intrinsic motivation.
Denote by
퐸훼˜[훼] = 퐸[훼∣훼 < 훼˜]
the expected value of the truncated distribution of Principal’s altruism param-
eter, bounded at the top by 훼˜.
The signaling game outcome in the ”most reasonable” equilibrium is char-
acterized by the following Proposition.
Proposition 6. 1. If 훼 is distributed inside the interval [훼×, 1], then all
the Principals implement their preferred output in the ”most reasonable”
equilibrium, i.e. the equilibrium contract is
푞 = 푞푃 (훼)
2. If 훼1 < 훼
× and
푞0 (퐸훼, 훽) > 푞푃 (훼2) (30)
then there exists 훼˜ ∈ [훼×, 훼2] determined as solution to
푞˜0 ≡ 푞0 (퐸훼˜[훼], 훽) = 푞
푃 (퐸훼˜[훼]) (31)
such that the ”most reasonable” equilibrium contract is given by
푞 =
{
푞푃 (훼, 훽) for 훼 > 훼˜
푞˜0 for 훼 ≤ 훼˜
where 푞˜0 is determined by (31).
3. If the inequality (30) doesn’t hold29, then the ”most reasonable” equilib-
rium contract is full pooling with
푞 = 푞0 (퐸훼, 훽)
28
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Figure 8: Equilibrium in signaling game. Case 1
The Proof of Claim Proposition 6 is given in the Appendix.
Figure 8 illustrates the equilibrium contract for the case when ex-ante all the
Principals in the population are highly-altruistic, i.e. 훼 ≥ 훼× and can inspire
the Agent to perform at their preferred level (point 1 of the Proposition).
Figure 9 illustrates the case when there are both generous and tough Prin-
cipals, i.e. with altruism greater and smaller than 훼×, but there are enough
Principals with high altruism (point 2 of the proposition). In this case only
a part of the Principals’ subpopulation with 훼 > 훼×, for instance those with
훼 ≥ 훼ˆ implement their preferred performance level 푞푃 .
The first case from Proposition 6 emerges for high 훽. As 훽 decreases, the
equilibrium structure switches to the one described at point 2 of the Proposition
and then to the one of point 3.
Similarly to the 2-type case, when the Agent is highly reciprocal, the sepa-
rating equilibrium in which all the Principals implement their preferred output
emerges. For lower levels of reciprocity, the equilibrium structure shifts to pool-
ing and a larger share of Principals can’t implement their preferred performance
level.
4.4 Application to the Organization Design
For the 2-type framework, the generous Principal implements her preferred out-
put for 훽 ∈ [훽3, 1]. In this case she cares neither about the altruism level of
the tough Principals 훼퐿, nor about the structure of the Principals’ population
characterized by Π.
28The fact that it can be that 훼× > 1 is not a problem.
29This implies 훼1 < 훼×.
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Figure 9: Equilibrium in signaling game. Case 2
However, if 훽 ∈ [0, 훽3), the generous Principal can’t implement her preferred
output in the emerging pooling equilibrium. In this case she is affected by the
adverse effect which emerges due to the very existence of the tough Principals
in the population.
Such adverse effect is present for the continuum-type framework as well. In
particular, for the case illustrated by Figure 9, the Principals with 훼 ∈ [훼×, 훼˜)
are affected. For the case, described in point 3 of Proposition 6, the whole
generous subpopulation with 훼 ∈ [훼×, 훼2] is affected.
Even a part of the ”tough” Principals with 훼 < 훼× is affected as they get
output lower than the Agent’s participation threshold would the Principals’ type
be revealed. For the case depicted by Figure 9, these have 훼 ∈ (퐸훼ˆ[훼], 훼
×]; for
the case of point 3 of Proposition 6 these have 훼 ∈ (퐸훼, 훼×].
In both frameworks - the 2-type and the continuum-type,
∙ the most altruistic Principals (among the generous ones) are less likely to
be affected,
∙ if Agent’s reciprocity is high, then all the concerned Principals are less
likely to be affected,
∙ if tough Principals are not too tough or if they represent a smaller share in
the population (so that the expected altruism level in the whole population
is high enough), then all the concerned Principals are less likely to be
affected.
This means that the most generous Principals care to a lesser extent about
the environment in which they operate. For the Principals which are generous
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but not the most generous ones, the environment can play an important role
for their ability to elicit a high performance level and they prefer to be in the
environment of the generous Principals and highly reciprocal Agents.
The counterpart of the adverse effect is an advantageous effect for the tough
Principals which emerges due to the very existence of the generous Principals
in the population. In the 2-type framework, for the case of 훽 ∈ [0, 훽2) the
tough Principal gets an output which exceeds the Agent’s participation thresh-
old would the type of the tough Principals be revealed. In the continuum-type
framework, some Principals benefit from the same advantage: for the case de-
picted by Figure 9, these are ones with 훼 ∈ [훼1, 퐸훼˜[훼]). The advantageous effect
appears when the tough Principal can mimic to be the generous ones (or when
these more generous can’t separate from the tougher ones).
As a result, the tough Principals prefer having highly reciprocal Agents and
if this is not the case - then to be in the environment of the generous Principals
to benefit from the advantageous effect in the pooling equilibrium.
Now let us take a point of view of an organization designer. Assume that
he has a choice - whether to create an organizations of type A in which the
Principals’ population is mixed, or create an organization of type B in which
the generous and tough Principals are separated. The organization designer
informs in this way the Agents about the Principal’s altruism (the information
can still be imprecise).
For instance, in the 2-type framework, the organization designer can separate
the two types, in the continuum-type framework, the designer can separate the
Principals with 훼 > 훼× from those below the threshold 훼×.
An interesting question is how the choice of organization type influences the
overall performance in the organization?
Clearly, in the organizations of type A, the generous Principals will imple-
ment a lower output, whereas in the organizations of type B the generous Prin-
cipals will get a higher output. This shows that if separation emerges as a result
of signaling (endogenously), the tough Principals implement a higher output;
if separation is exogenous, then the relation between the outputs, implemented
by the tough and generous Principals, is reversed.
Figure 10 illustrates exogenous Principals’ separation compared to the en-
dogenous Principals’ population for the continuum-type framework.
4.5 A ”Unifying” framework
The three models considered above - the model without extrinsic incentives and
the two models related to the experiments have a lot in common and can be
unified in the following way.
At stage 1, the Principal sends a message - fixes 푄ˆ - the set of feasible
performance levels for the Agent. Performance is costly for the Agent. At stage
2, the Agent decides whether to comply or disobey. In case of compliance, the
Agent chooses an element 푞 ∈ 푄ˆ - the implemented performance level. In case
of disobeying, the Agent chooses a disobedience option in a set of disobedience
options30
∘
푄:
∘
푞 ∈
∘
푄.
30The set of performance levels can be considered as a subset of the disobedience options:
푄ˆ ⊂
∘
푄. Alternatively, the set of disobedience options can be considered as a set of all possible
Agent’s actions.
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Figure 10: Application to the organization design. The effect of exogenous
separation of the Principals’ population
For the model without extrinsic incentives 푄ˆ = {푞} - the required output
level, compliance corresponds to agreement to perform at level 푞 (푎(푞) = 1),
disobeying corresponds to
∘
푞 = 0 or, equivalently, to 푎(푞) = 0. For the Trust
Game the performance set is 푄ˆ = [푞ˆ,+∞), compliance corresponds to the choice
of some back-transfer 푞 ∈ [푞ˆ,+∞), disobeying corresponds to the choice of
∘
푞 < 푞ˆ,
in the equilibrium with disobedience
∘
푞 = 푞퐴. Finally, for the Control game
푄ˆ = (푞푐,+∞), compliance means the choice of effort higher than the minimal
requirement, disobeying is the choice of effort at the minimal level:
∘
푞 = 푞푐.
All the three models are based on the reciprocal altruism framework. This
means that the Agent is intrinsically motivated but there is a gap between the
Principal’s preferred performance level and that of the Agent. The Agent prefers
the lower performance.
The weaker the Principal’s altruism (i.e. the less generous she is), the larger
is the gap, the more the Principal suffers from leaving the Agent too much
flexibility, i.e. not restricting at all or imposing only slight restrictions on the
performance set 푄ˆ. Consequently, it’s in the Principal’s interest (especially, the
tough Principal) to make a strict offer - i.e. to restrict the Agent’s performance
set 푄ˆ to avoid a large deviation from her preferred performance level. On the
other hand, offering a slightly restricted or non restricted at all, compared to
∘
푄,
performance set 푄ˆ is a generous offer, which is likely to be made by the highly
altruistic Principal.
By offering a generous performance set 푄ˆ, the Principal can signal her gen-
erosity. By learning the Principal’s generosity, the Agent becomes inspired for
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better performance, i.e. intrinsically motivated. An extrinsic motivator, added
to the intrinsic motivation, leads to even better performance for the symmetric
information on the Principal’s generosity. However, for the case of asymmetric
information, the use of an extrinsic motivator signals the non-generosity of the
Principal (for the case of separating equilibrium) and crowds out the Agent’s
intrinsic motivation.
Such a crowding mechanism influences the Agent’s performance for the Trust
Game and for the Control game - performance for the tough Principal can be
lower than for the generous one, despite the low performance is feasible for the
performance set, proposed by the highly altruistic Principal.
The motivation crowding out is presented in the model without extrinsic
incentives as well, though it doesn’t result in the crowding-out of performance,
because the signaling of generosity goes through offering the performance level
itself, not the (non-trivial) set of the performance levels, as in the Trust and
Control games.
In the model without extrinsic incentives, the Agent attached to the generous
Principal gets higher utility from an interaction. Indeed, he is intrinsically moti-
vated for high performance (the participation threshold is high) but is asked for
lower performance, and, consequently, gets positive utility. The Agent attached
to the tough Principal gets positive utility only for the separating equilibria
with 훽 ∈ (훽1, 1] - see Figure 7. For 훽 ∈ (훽2, 훽1] the Agent performs at his
participation threshold and gets zero utility, for 훽 ≤ 훽2 the Agent gets negative
utility in the pooling equilibria.
Another common feature of the Trust and the Control games is the effect of
the strength of an extrinsic motivator. If it is weak, not using it can not signal
the Principal’s generosity. In fact, in the Control Game if the threshold 푞푐 is
small, it is not used by both types31 and has no effect at the performance level.
In the Trust Game, if the fine 푓 is small, it is used by both types (the two lines
푞퐴 and 푞ˆ퐴 are close to each other so that pooling with both types imposing the
fine emerges).32
If the available extrinsic motivator is strong enough but not too strong and
Agent’s reciprocity intensity is high enough, the generous Principal can signal
her generosity by not using the extrinsic motivator. The tough Principal prefers
to reveal her type and to crowd out the Agent’s intrinsic motivation in this
way because she gets better performance by using the extrinsic motivator and
compensating in this way the crowding out of the intrinsic motivation.
Finally, if the available extrinsic motivator is very strong, both types can
benefit form using it. The generous Principal crowds out the intrinsic motivation
to the pooling level but gets compensated through high additional extrinsic
motivation of the Agent.
5 Conclusion
My paper contributes both to the relatively new field of behavioral economics
and to the theory of incentives. More specifically, I develop a model which goes
31Alternatively, it can be used by both types - see case I of proposition 2.
32Only the Control game experiment provides an evidence supporting the reciprocal altruism
model. There were no variation of the size of the extrinsic incentive, i.e. the fine, in the Trust
Game experiment.
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beyond the neoclassical framework and takes into account the social components
of preferences. I build a simple and intuitive model of reciprocal altruism and
show its relevance for the contract theory and theory of incentives as it accounts
for the behavioral patterns, systematically observed both in the lab and in the
field.
The relevance of altruism and reciprocity as parts of human nature is sup-
ported by compelling evidence. The Dictator Game introduced in Kahneman
et al. [1986] provides evidence for pure altruism33. The survey of Andreoni
[2006] demonstrates that impure altruism - taste for ”warm glow” shapes peo-
ple’s decisions in many circumstances. The evidence for reciprocity34 is provided
by Berg et al. [1995] who introduced the Trust Game, which was repeated with
modifications in Fehr and Rockenbach [2003], Fehr and List [2004] and others.
The evidence also comes from variants of the Gift Exchange Game by Fehr et al.
[1997]; Lost Wallet Game by Dufwenberg and Gneezy [2000] and Charness et al.
[2007]; Moonlighting Game by Abbink et al. [2000].
The model of the paper predicts that crowding-out in performance can
emerge as the equilibrium outcome for some values of parameters of the model.
The crowding-out in performance is the situation in which imposing an extrinsic
incentive decreases the intrinsic motivation and leads to a lower performance
- the phenomena, well-known in human resources management. It can also be
the case (for some other values of parameters) that crowding-out in incentives
doesn’t result in crowding-out in performance.
I show that for the crowding-out equilibrium to emerge, the sorting condition
is required, which, in turn is guaranteed when the available extrinsic incentives
is neither too weak neither too strong.
This paper is among a few others studies aimed at enriching the theory of
incentives by taking into account intrinsic motivation. Further research can
be devoted to considering other information structures - Agents can differ in
productivity, the organization can have more complicated structure than only
one Principal and only one Agent. Considering other social components of
preferences, supported by the evidence from lab and field (negative reciprocity,
concerns for equity etc.) can also be relevant in building the theory of incentives.
Finally, I don’t claim that monetary incentives are not important. On the
contrary, it is well-known that the incentive payments play an important role
in creating incentives - see e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont [2005] or Prendergast
[1999]. However, there is growing evidence that workers are motivated to exert
effort not only by the incentive payment or other extrinsic motivators but also
by the intrinsic motivation. On top of this, the interaction between intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation can play an important role. The result of such inter-
action can be motivation crowding-out (or -in). Therefore, taking into account
the intrinsic motivation in the labor contract models should give better under-
standing of the workplace relation. Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives
should be considered as complements rather than substitutes in the modeling.
33In the various Dictator Game experiments, the subjects are endowed with a sum of money.
They decide then on how much of this windfall endowment to give to a stranger. More than
half of the subjects give between 20% and 50% of the endowment.
34Precisely, ”intrinsic reciprocity”, not ”consequentialism” or ”strategic reciprocity”.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. The root exists and is unique since 푈(0) = 퐵 > 0, 푈(푞) increases for
푞 ∈ (0, 푞퐴), so that 푈(푞퐴) > 0, then decreases for 푞 ∈ (푞퐴,∞) and 푈(푞)→ −∞
as 푞 → ∞. Because of continuity of 푈(푞), there exists a unique 푞0 ∈ (푞퐴,∞)
such that 푈(푞0) = 0.
Proof of Claim 1
Proof. Statements 1 is trivial since the Agent has full flexibility and hence
chooses his preferred back-transfer.
For the 2-nd point, notice that if the desired back-transfer 푞ˆ ≤ 푞퐴, then
paying back 푞퐴 will not impose fine and will maximize the Agent’s utility (푞퐴
is the global maximizer).
Consider the case 푞ˆ > 푞퐴.
Notice that 푞˜퐴(훼ˆ) is constructed in such way that
∘
푈(푞) >
∘
푈(푞퐴)− 푓 for 푞퐴(훼ˆ, 훽) < 푞ˆ < 푞˜퐴(훼ˆ, 훽) (32)
∘
푈(푞) <
∘
푈(푞퐴)− 푓 for 푞ˆ > 푞˜퐴(훼ˆ, 훽) (33)
where
∘
푈(푞) is the Agent’s utility without taking into account the possibility of
fine: 푈(푞) =
∘
푈(푞)− 푓퐼푞<푞ˆ.
In (32) the Agent prefers to diverge from 푞퐴 to 푞 > 푞퐴 as such divergence
isn’t too high whereas in (33) the Agents prefers to pay fine.
Proof of the Proposition 1
Proof. The optimality of the Principal’s decision given the Agents’s beliefs is
evident from Claim 1. We should check the incentives compatibility conditions
and the crowding-out condition.
Consider the case 푞퐿퐻 ≤ 푞˜퐿퐿.
The Principal’s incentive compatibility constraints are
휋퐻(푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐻퐶(푞퐻퐻 )) + (1− 휋퐻) ⋅ 0 ≥ 푞˜퐿퐿 − 훼퐻퐶(푞˜퐿퐿)
푞˜퐿퐿 − 훼퐿퐶(푞˜퐿퐿) ≥ 휋퐿(푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞퐻퐻)) + (1 − 휋퐿) ⋅ 0
which are equivalent to (12) and (13), correspondingly.
The inequality 휋ˆ퐻 ≤ 1 holds since the denominator in (12) is positive and
the inequality is then equivalent to
퐶(푞퐻퐻)− 퐶(푞˜퐿퐿)
푞퐻퐻 − 푞˜퐿퐿
≤
1
훼퐻
The left-hand side 1
훼퐻
≥ 1. The right-hand side is the slope of the secant
line to the graph of the convex function 퐶(푞) between the points with 푞 = 푞˜퐿퐿
and 푞 = 푞퐻퐻 , which is smaller than the slope of the tangent line at the point
with 푞 = 푞퐻퐻 which is equal to 퐶
′(푞퐻퐻) = 훼퐻훽퐻 < 1. So, the inequality holds.
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The inequality 휋ˆ퐿 > 0 holds since both the numerator and the denominator
of the fraction are positive.
Finally, we need to check the crowding-out condition 휋푞퐻퐻 ≥ 푞˜퐿퐿, where 휋
is the objective probability of the selfish Agents. Since the selfish Principal has
beliefs 휋퐿 which is biased downward, it is sufficient to prove that 휋ˆ퐿푞퐻퐻 ≥ 푞˜퐿퐿.
Substituting 휋ˆ퐿 into the inequality, we get
푞˜퐿퐿 − 훼퐿퐶(푞˜퐿퐿)
푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞퐻퐻 )
푞퐻퐻 ≥ 푞˜퐿퐿
Since the denominator is positive, this inequality is equivalent to
훼퐿푞˜퐿퐿푞퐻퐻
(
퐶(푞퐻퐻)
푞퐻퐻
−
퐶(푞˜퐿퐿)
푞˜퐿퐿
)
≥ 0
which holds since 푞퐻퐻 > 푞˜퐿퐿, 푞˜퐿퐿 < 푞˜퐿퐻 and it’s assumed that 푞˜퐿퐻 < 푞퐻퐻 .
Proof of the Corollary 1
Proof. The condition 푞퐿퐻 ≤ 푞˜퐿퐿 is equivalent to 퐶(푞퐿퐻) ≤ 퐶(푞˜퐿퐿). Since
퐶(푞˜퐿퐿) = 푓 , it leads to 퐶(푞퐿퐻) ≤ 푓 , so that 푓1 = 퐶(푞퐿퐻).
Now check the condition 푞˜퐿퐻 ≤ 푞퐻퐻 .
The back-transfer 푞˜퐿퐻 is determined, according to Claim 1 by
훼퐿훽퐻푞퐿퐻 − 퐶(푞퐿퐻)− 푓 = 훼퐿훽퐻 푞˜퐿퐻 − 퐶(푞˜퐿퐻)
where 푞˜퐿퐻 is chosen on the decreasing part of the graph of the function
퐹 (푞) = 훼퐿훽퐻푞 − 퐶(푞) (see Figure 2). Consequently, 푞˜퐿퐻 ≤ 푞퐻퐻 is equivalent
to
훼퐿훽퐻푞퐿퐻 − 퐶(푞퐿퐻)− 푓 ≥ 훼퐿훽퐻푞퐻퐻 − 퐶(푞퐻퐻)
which can be rewritten as
푓2 ≡ (훼퐿훽퐻푞퐿퐻 − 퐶(푞퐿퐻))− (훼퐿훽퐻푞퐻퐻 − 퐶(푞퐻퐻)) = 푓2 ≥ 푓
Finally, to make sure that the interval [푓1, 푓2] is non-empty, we should check
that 푓1 ≤ 푓2. This leads to
훼퐿훼퐻훽
2
퐻
(
푞퐿퐻
훼퐿훽퐻
−
푞퐻퐻
훼퐻훽퐻
)
≤ 퐶(푞퐿퐻)
for a generic cost function.
For the quadratic cost function 퐶(푞) = 푐2푞
2, taking into account that 푞푖푗 are
determined by 퐶′(푞푖푗) = 훼푖훽푗 , and substituting this into the last inequality, one
can check that the left-hand side is equal to zero, so that the inequality always
holds.
Finally, for given 훼퐿, 훼퐻 , 훽퐻 , and 푓 ∈ [푓1, 푓2], one can obtain the threshold
values 휋ˆ퐿 ≥ 0, 휋ˆ퐻 ≤ 1 from (12) and (13), and take the values 휋퐿 and 휋퐻 ,
satisfying 휋퐻 ≥ 휋ˆ퐻 , 휋퐿 ≤ 휋ˆ퐿. For these parameters, according to Proposition 1,
the equilibrium of the signaling game is the separating crowding-out equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. For the case 푞푐 ≥ 푞퐿퐻 , the incentives compatibility constraints for the
Principal are:
휋퐻(푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐻퐶(푞퐻퐻 )) ≥ 푞푐 − 훼퐻퐶(푞푐)
푞푐 − 훼퐿퐶(푞푐) ≥ 휋퐿(푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞퐻퐻 ))
These constraints are equivalent to the conditions 휋퐿 ≤ 휋ˆ퐿 and 휋퐻 ≥ 휋ˆ퐻 ,
which are assumed to hold.
Check the crowding-out condition 휋푞퐻퐻 ≥ 푞푐. Since 휋 > 휋퐿, the inequality
휋퐿푞퐻퐻 ≥ 푞푐 is stronger. I check the latter inequality for 휋퐿 = 휋ˆ퐿.
Substituting the formulae for 휋ˆ퐿, we get
푞˜ − 훼퐿퐶(푞˜)
푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞퐻퐻)
푞퐻퐻 ≥ 푞˜
after rearranging it leads to
퐶(푞˜)
푞˜
≤
퐶(푞퐻퐻)
푞퐻퐻
which is equivalent to 푞˜ ≤ 푞퐻퐻 since the function 퐶(푞) is convex. The latter
inequality is assumed to hold.
So, at least for 휋퐿 close to 휋ˆ퐿 the crowding-out condition holds.
For the case of 푞푐 < 푞퐿퐻 , the incentives compatibility constraints for the
Principal are:
휋퐻(푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐻퐶(푞퐻퐻)) ≥ 휋퐻(푞퐿퐻 − 훼퐻퐶(푞퐿퐻)) + (1− 휋퐻)(푞푐 − 훼퐻퐶(푞푐))
휋퐿(푞퐿퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞퐿퐻)) + (1− 휋퐿)(푞푐 − 훼퐿퐶(푞푐)) ≥ 휋퐿(푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞퐻퐻))
As in the previous case, the crowding-out condition will hold at least for 휋퐿
close to 푞˜퐿 if 휋ˆ퐿푞퐻퐻 ≥ 푞푐. Substituting the expression for 휋ˆ퐿 gives
푞푐 − 훼퐿퐶(푞푐)
[푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞퐻퐻)] + [푞푐 − 훼퐿퐶(푞푐)]− [푞퐿퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞퐿퐻)]
푞퐻퐻 ≥ 푞푐
which can be rearranged to
훼퐿푞퐻퐻
[
퐶(푞퐻퐻)
푞퐻퐻
−
퐶(푞푐)
푞푐
]
≥ (푞퐿퐻 − 푞푐)
[
훼퐿
퐶(푞퐿퐻)− 퐶(푞푐)
푞퐿퐻 − 푞푐
− 1
]
(34)
The left-hand side term 퐶(푞퐻퐻 )
푞퐻퐻
− 퐶(푞푐)
푞푐
> 0 because 푞퐻퐻 > 푞퐿퐻 > 푞푐.
The right-hand side term 퐶(푞퐿퐻)−퐶(푞푐)
푞퐿퐻−푞푐
< 1, because it’s a slope of the secant
line to the graph of the increasing convex function 퐶(푞), which is lower than
the slope of the tangent line at the right edge of the interval [푞푐, 푞퐿퐻 ], 퐶
′(푞퐿퐻),
for which we have 퐶′(푞퐿퐻) = 훼퐿훽퐻 < 1.
So, the right-hand side in (34) is positive, the left-hand side is negative, and,
consequently, the inequality (34) holds.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The proposition is established by checking the equilibrium conditions
case by case.
Consider the no-control pooling equilibrium candidate. Each of the Princi-
pals shouldn’t have an incentive to deviate to control, in which case the output
푞푐 will be obtained. For the pooling equilibrium the Agent’s beliefs on the
Principal’s type on the equilibrium path is 퐸훼, and the pro-social Agent will
perform at the level 푞퐸퐻 , determined by 퐶
′(푞퐸퐻) = 퐸훼훽퐻 , the selfish Agent
will perform at level 푞 = 0. So, the two Best Response conditions for the two
types of Principal are
푉퐻 = 휋퐻(푞퐸퐻 − 훼퐻퐶(푞퐸퐻)) ≥ 푞푐 − 훼퐻퐶(푞푐)
푉퐿 = 휋퐿(푞퐸퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞퐸퐻)) ≥ 푞푐 − 훼퐿퐶(푞푐)
The two inequalities hold for small 푞푐, since the right-hand sides are equal to
0 for 푞푐 = 0. The first condition which becomes binding for small 푞푐 determines
the threshold 푞1.
For the large 푞푐, the right-hand sides of the two inequalities are negative.
By decreasing 푞푐, the inequality for 푉퐿 becomes bonding and determines the
threshold 푞6.
Consider the control pooling equilibrium. The Principals’ Best Response
conditions are (the Agent will reasonable believe that the Principal deviating
to no-control should be the selfish one)
푉퐻 = 푞푐 − 훼퐻퐶(푞푐) ≥ 휋퐻(푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐻퐶(푞퐻퐻 ))
푉퐿 = 푞푐 − 훼퐿퐶(푞푐) ≥ 휋퐿(푞퐻퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞퐻퐻))
The inequality for the 푉퐻 is stronger and determines the lower and upper
bounds for the values of 푞푐 ∈ [푞3, 푞4] for which the control pooling equilibrium
emerges.
The case of the separating equilibrium is partially considered in Proposition
2. The conditions for the separating equilibrium to the right of the control
pooling region are the same, and the ”right-hand side” separating equilibrium
emerges due to non-monotonicity of the payoff functions. The regions for 푞푐 are
[푞2, 푞3] on the left and [푞4, 푞5] on the right.
So, all the possible pure strategies equilibria are considered. The regions of
the values of 푞푐 not covered by the pure strategies equilibria, should bring the
mixed strategies equilibria.
Proof of Lemma 5
According to (25), for any Best Response acceptance rule 푎(⋅) holds
푎(푞) ∈ argmax
푎∈[0,1]
(퐵 − 퐶(푞) + 훼ˆ(푞)훽푞) 푎
The solution to this program is easy to find. If, for some 푞, 퐵 − 퐶(푞) + 훼ˆ(푞)훽푞 > 0
then 푎(푞) = 1, if 퐵 − 퐶(푞) + 훼ˆ(푞)훽푞 < 0, then 푎(푞) = 0 for the corresponding
values of 푞, finally, if 퐵 − 퐶(푞) + 훼ˆ(푞)훽푞 = 0, then any 푎 is a solution .
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According to lemma 4, the participation constraint 퐵 − 퐶(푞) + 훼ˆ(푞)훽푞 > 0
is equivalent to the threshold 푞 < 푞0(훼ˆ(푞), 훽). This gives the characterization
of the Best Response rule.
Since 휇(푞) ∈ [0, 1], then 훼퐿 ≤ 훼ˆ(푞) ≤ 훼퐻 , consequently, according to mono-
tonicity of the function 푞0(훼, 훽) with respect to its first argument (see lemma
4) we obtain
푞0(훼퐿, 훽) ≤ 푞
0(훼ˆ(푞), 훽) ≤ 푞0(훼퐻 , 훽)
which can be rewritten as 푞0퐿 ≤ 푞
0(훼ˆ(푞), 훽) ≤ 푞0퐻 . This proofs (27).
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Since 푞∗푗 (푗 = 퐿,퐻) are the elements of the Best Response of the Prin-
cipal, the two inequalities hold:
(푞∗퐿 − 훼퐿퐶(푞
∗
퐿))푎
∗(푞∗퐿) ≥ (푞
∗
퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞
∗
퐻))푎
∗(푞∗퐻)
(푞∗퐻 − 훼퐻퐶(푞
∗
퐻))푎
∗(푞∗퐻) ≥ (푞
∗
퐿 − 훼퐻퐶(푞
∗
퐿))푎
∗(푞∗퐿)
Summing them up gives
(훼퐻 − 훼퐿)(퐶(푞
∗
퐿)푎
∗(푞∗퐿)− 퐶(푞
∗
퐻)푎
∗(푞∗퐻)) ≥ 0
which proves the first statement in the Lemma.
For the second claim of the Lemma, notice that if 푎∗(푞∗퐻) = 1, then
퐶(푞∗퐿) ≥ 퐶(푞
∗
퐿)푎
∗(푞∗퐿) ≥ 퐶(푞
∗
퐻)
which gives 푞∗퐿 ≥ 푞
∗
퐻 .
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Let 푞′, 푞′′ ∈ supp 휎∗퐻 and 푞
′, 푞′′ ∈ supp 휎∗퐿 are the two offers made by
both types in an equilibrium. Then, the two types should be indifferent between
the two offers:
(푞′ − 훼퐻퐶(푞
′))푎∗(푞′) = (푞′′ − 훼퐻퐶(푞
′′))푎∗(푞′′)
(푞′ − 훼퐿퐶(푞
′))푎∗(푞′) = (푞′′ − 훼퐿퐶(푞
′′))푎∗(푞′′)
This gives
훼퐻(퐶(푞
′′)푎∗(푞′′)− 퐶(푞′)푎∗(푞′)) = 훼퐿(퐶(푞
′′)푎∗(푞′′)− 퐶(푞′)푎∗(푞′)) =
= 푞′′푎∗(푞′′)− 푞′푎∗(푞′) (35)
The first equality gives 퐶(푞′′)푎∗(푞′′)− 퐶(푞′)푎∗(푞′) = 0. This, in turn, gives
푎∗(푞′′)
푎∗(푞′)
=
푞′
푞′′
=
퐶(푞′)
퐶(푞′′)
But the second part of this equality can’t hold for a convex function 퐶(푞) if
푞′ ∕= 푞′′. This finishes the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. Consider the case 훽 > 훽2, then 푞
푃
퐻 < 푞
0
퐿 and, consequently the offer 푞
푃
퐻
has to be accepted with probability 1 on the equilibrium path. By definition, the
offer 푞푃퐻 maximizes the 훼퐻 -type utility. This means that 훼퐻 -type will offer only
푞 = 푞푃퐻 . Moreover, some offers, higher than 푞
푃
퐻 , are accepted with probability
1, and consequently, 훼퐿-type will never be interested to pool at 푞
푃
퐻 . So, there
can’t be any equilibrium with a pooling part (i.e. pooling or semi-separating)
for 훽 > 훽2.
Consider the case 훽 ≤ 훽2 and the pooling equilibria.
According to Lemma 7, the pooling equilibrium offer 푞∗푝 is unique.
First, prove the necessity of the three conditions:
푞∗푝 ≤ 푞
0
퐸 , 푞
∗
푝 ≤ 푞
00
퐿 , 푞
∗
푝 ≥ 푞
0
퐿 (36)
1. The beliefs should be consistent on the equilibrium path, which means
that 휇∗(푞∗푝) = Π. This gives 훼ˆ(푞
∗
푝) = Π and the corresponding acceptance
threshold 푞ˆ(푞∗푝) = 푞
0
퐸 , according to (22) and Lemma 5. So, to have the offer 푞
∗
푝
accepted, it is necessary to have 푞∗푝 ≤ 푞
0
퐸 .
2. If the inequality 푞∗푝 ≤ 푞
00
퐿 is violated, then 훼퐻 -type has a profitable
deviation to 푞˜ = 푞0퐿 − 휀 for small enough 휀. In fact, since the function 푉 (푞, 훼퐻)
is decreasing in 푞 for 푞 > 푞00퐿 > 푞
퐻
푃 and according to the definition of 푞
00
퐿 ,
we have 푉 (푞∗푝 , 훼퐻) < 푉 (푞
00
퐿 , 훼퐻) = 푉 (푞
0
퐿, 훼퐻). Consequently, since 푉 (푞, 훼퐻)
is increasing in 푞 for 푞 < 푞0퐿 < 푞
푃
퐻 , we have 푉 (푞
∗
푝, 훼퐻) < 푉 (푞
0
퐿 − 휀, 훼퐻) for
small enough 휀. Since 푎∗(푞0퐿 − 휀) = 1, we have then 푉 (푞
∗
푝 , 훼퐻)푎
∗(푞∗푝) < 푉 (푞
0
퐿 −
휀, 훼퐻)푎
∗(푞0퐿 − 휀).
3. If 푞∗푝 < 푞
0
퐿, then there is a profitable deviation for both Principal’s types
to 푞∗푝 + 휀, since the latter offer is still accepted with probability 1.
The necessity of the condition 푎∗(푞∗푝) = 1 for 푞
∗
푝 < 푞
0
퐸 is evident.
Second, prove the sufficiency of (36).
Consider a profile (푞∗푝, 푎
∗(⋅);휇∗(⋅)) with offer 푞∗푝 satisfying (36), acceptance
rule 푎∗(푞∗푝) = 1, 푎
∗(푞) = 0 for (푞 ∕= 푞∗푝 , 푞 > 푞
0
퐿), supported by beliefs 휇
∗(푞∗푝) = Π,
휇∗(푞) = 0 for 푞 ∕= 푞∗푝.
Then, any downward deviation for both Principal’s type isn’t profitable,
since it’s either rejected or is too large (below 푞0퐿). Any upward deviation is
rejected, so isn’t profitable, too. Accepting of 푞∗푝 is the Best Response for the
Agent, and beliefs are consistent.
Finally, the relation between 푞0퐿, 푞
푃
퐿 , 푞
0
퐸 , determined by the thresholds 훽푗
in Proposition 4, leads to the statement of the lemma for the pooling equilibria.
Consider the case 훽 ≤ 훽2 and the semi-separating equilibria.
In any semi-separating equilibrium there is a unique (according to lemma 7)
pooling offer 푞∗푝. Denote by 푎
∗
푝 = 푎
∗(푞∗푝) the probability of acceptance of this
offer.
Assume that there exists an equilibrium offer 푞∗퐿 ∈ supp 휎
∗
퐿 ∖ 휎
∗
퐻 (not neces-
sarily unique), made by 훼퐿-type only. Let 푎
∗
퐿 = 푎
∗(푞∗퐿). Then, 훼퐿-type should
be independent between the offers 푞∗푝 and 푞
∗
퐿:(
푞∗푝 − 훼퐿퐶(푞
∗
푝)
)
푎∗푝 = (푞
∗
퐿 − 훼퐿퐶(푞
∗
퐿)) 푎
∗
퐿 (37)
On top of this, since the offer 푞∗푝 is made by 훼퐻 -type, according to the
monotonicity lemma 6,
퐶(푞∗푝)푎
∗
푝 ≤ 퐶(푞
∗
퐿)푎
∗
퐿 (38)
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Taking (37) and (38) together, we obtain
퐶(푞∗퐿)
푞∗
퐿
≥
퐶(푞∗푝)
푞∗푝
which, in turn, leads
to 푞∗퐿 ≥ 푞
∗
푝.
At the same time, the offer 푞∗퐿 lies in the separating part of the semi-
separating equilibrium, so 휇∗(푞∗퐿) = 0 and to be accepted, there should be
푞∗퐿 ≤ 푞
0
퐿. On the other hand, 푞
∗
푝 ≥ 푞
0
퐿, because otherwise there will be profitable
deviation to 푞∗푝 + 휀 for both types. So, we have 푞
0
퐿 ≥ 푞
∗
퐿 ≥ 푞
∗
푝 ≥ 푞
0
퐿, which is
impossible for 푞∗퐿 ∕= 푞
∗
푝.
So, it’s impossible to have an offer 푞∗퐿 in the separating part of the semi-
separating equilibrium.
Consider now the possibility of having the separating part for 훼퐻 -type. Let
푞∗퐻 ∈ supp 휎
∗
퐻 ∖ supp 휎
∗
퐿 be (one of) offers, made by the 훼퐻 -type only, and let
푎∗퐻 = 푎
∗(푞∗퐻).
As in the previous case, the indifference for 훼퐻 -type and the monotonicity
condition from lemma 6 should hold:
(푞∗퐻 − 훼퐻퐶(푞
∗
퐻)) 푎
∗
퐻 =
(
푞∗푝 − 훼퐻퐶(푞
∗
푝)
)
푎∗푝 (39)
퐶(푞∗퐻)푎
∗
퐻 ≤ 퐶(푞
∗
푝)푎
∗
푝 (40)
Taken together, these conditions lead to
퐶(푞∗퐻)
푞∗
퐻
≤
퐶(푞∗푝)
푞∗푝
which means that
푞∗퐻 ≤ 푞
∗
푝.
Clearly, both 푞∗퐻 and 푞
∗
푝 can’t be less than 푞
0
퐿, otherwise there will be a
profitable deviation for both types to the offer, greater by 휀, which has to be
accepted with probability 1.
Since 푞∗푝 < 푞
0
퐸 (to be accepted with non-zero probability), then 푞
∗
퐻 < 푞
0
퐸 <
푞0퐻 for all equilibrium offers 푞
∗
퐻 . This means that they are accepted with proba-
bility 1, 푎∗(푞∗퐻) = 1. Any equilibrium offer 푞
∗
퐻 should solve max푞∈푄 푉 (푞, 훼푗) 푎
∗(푞),
and, since 푎∗(푞∗퐻) = 1, they should solve max푞∈푄 푉 (푞, 훼푗). However, a solution
of this program can consist of at most two points because of inverted-U shape
of 푉 (푞). Moreover, for 훽 ≤ 훽3 the function 푉 (푞, 훼퐻) is an increasing function
in 푞 ∈ [0, 푞0퐸 ], so the solution of the program is unique, and consequently, there
can be only one equilibrium offer 푞∗퐻 in the separating part for 훼퐻 -type.
This finishes the proof for the semi-separating equilibrium.
Separating equilibria For the case 훽 > 훽2 the offer 푞
푃
퐻 is accepted with
probability 1, since 푞푃퐻 < 푞
0
퐿, so 훼퐻 -type will offer 푞
푃
퐻 and get 푉 (푞
푃
퐻 , 훼퐻) = max푞 푉 (푞, 훼퐻).
Consider now the optimal offer for 훼퐿-type. For 훽 > 훽1 the offer 푞
푃
퐿 is ac-
cepted with probability 1, since 푞푃퐿 < 푞
0
퐿, so 훼퐿-type will offer 푞
푃
퐿 and get
푉 (푞푃퐿 , 훼퐿) = max푞 푉 (푞, 훼퐿). For the case 훽2 < 훽 ≤ 훽1, 훼퐿-type will make the
maximal acceptable offer, which is 푞0퐿. It has to be accepted with probability 1
on the equilibrium path, because otherwise there will be profitable deviation for
훼퐿-type to an offer 푞˜ = 푞
0
퐿−휀 with small enough 휀 (in fact, the offer 푞˜ has to be
accepted with probability 1, since 푞˜ < 푞)퐿0, and 푉 (푞˜, 훼퐿) > 푉 (푞
0
퐿, 훼퐿)푎
∗(푞0퐿) if
푎∗(푞0퐿) < 1).
When 훽 ≤ 훽2, in a separating equilibrium there should be at least two
different offers 푞∗퐿 ∈ supp 휎
∗
퐿 and 푞
∗
퐻 ∈ supp 휎
∗
퐻 , accepted with probabilities 푎
∗
퐿
and 푎∗퐻 respectively. The incentive compatibilities constraints for them are
(푞∗퐻 − 훼퐻퐶(푞
∗
퐻))푎
∗
퐻 ≥ (푞
∗
퐿 − 훼퐻퐶(푞
∗
퐿))푎
∗
퐿
(푞∗퐿 − 훼퐿퐶(푞
∗
퐿))푎
∗
퐿 ≥ (푞
∗
퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞
∗
퐻))푎
∗
퐻
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which gives
푞∗퐿 − 훼퐿퐶(푞
∗
퐿)
푞∗퐻 − 훼퐿퐶(푞
∗
퐻)
≥
푎∗퐻
푎∗퐿
≥
푞∗퐿 − 훼퐻퐶(푞
∗
퐿)
푞∗퐻 − 훼퐻퐶(푞
∗
퐻)
and, after rearrangements,
퐶(푞∗퐿)
푞∗
퐿
≥
퐶(푞∗퐻)
푞∗
퐻
, which means that 푞∗퐿 ≥ 푞
∗
퐻 . In a
separating equilibrium there should be 푞∗퐿 > 푞
∗
퐻 for any equilibrium offers.
Any equilibrium offer 푞∗퐿 needs to be accepted with non-zero probability,
which means that 푞∗퐿 ≤ 푞
0
퐿. All the offers 푞
∗
퐿 < 푞
0
퐿 are accepted with probability
1. If 푞∗퐿 = 푞
0
퐿 and 푎
∗(푞0퐿) < 1, then there is a profitable deviation for 훼퐿-type
to 푞0퐿 − 휀. So, any equilibrium offer 푞
∗
퐿 should be accepted with probability 1.
However, since all the equilibrium offers 푞∗퐻 are below all the offers 푞
∗
퐿 and
the function 푉 (푞, 훼퐻) is increasing for 푞 ∈ [푞, 푞
0
퐿], then there is a profitable
deviation for 훼퐻 -type to one of the offers 푞
∗
퐿 ∈ supp 휎
∗
퐿.
This means that there can’t be any separating equilibrium for 훽 ≤ 훽2.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Since 푞0퐿 ≤ 푞
푃
퐿 , both functions 푉 (푞, 훼퐻) and 푉 (푞, 훼퐿) are increasing in
푞 ∈ [0, 푞0퐿].
Consider pooling equilibria. According to Lemma 8, 푞∗푝 ≤ 푞
0
퐸 holds for any
pooling PBE.
Check the intuitive criterion. Let 푞 be a deviation such that 푞 < 푞0퐸 . Then
max
푎∈퐵푅(풜,푞)
푉 (푞, 푎, 훼푗) = 푉 (푞, 훼푗) ⋅ 1
because, at least for the beliefs 휇(푞) = Π the offer 푞 should be accepted for any
reasonable acceptance rule - see Lemma 5.
Notice also that
min
푎∈퐵푅(풜′,푞)
푉 (푞, 푎, 훼푗) = 0 for 풜
′ = {훼퐿} or 풜
′ = 풜
min
푎∈퐵푅(풜′,푞)
푉 (푞, 푎, 훼푗) = 푉 (푞, 훼푗) for 풜
′ = {훼퐻}
because if beliefs are concentrated on the subset which contains 훼퐿, then beliefs
휇(푞) = 0 are possible and any offer 푞 > 푞0퐿 (which is the case here) is rejected
for any reasonable acceptance rule, so the minimal value of 푉 is zero. On the
other hand, if beliefs are concentrated on 훼퐻 , i.e. 휇(푞) = 1, the offer 푞 < 푞
0
퐻
(which is the case since 푞 < 푞0퐸 < 푞
0
퐻) is accepted.
So, the only possibility to have the intuitive criterion (29) violated is to have
풜 ∖ 퐽(푞) = {훼퐻} and 푉
∗
퐻 < 푉 (푞, 훼퐻). In other words, 훼퐻 -type should be
”reasonably” revealed by deviation to 푞 (see the definition of the set 퐽(푞)) and
this deviation should be profitable, i.e. 푞 should be closer to 푞푃퐻 , compared to
the distance between 푞∗푝 and 푞
푃
퐻 .
Three cases are possible as illustrated by figure 11: 1) 푞∗푝 ≤ 푞
푃
퐻 ; 2) 푞
푃
퐻 <
푞∗푝 ≤ 푞
푃
퐿 ; 3) 푞
∗
푝 > 푞
푃
퐿 .
For the case 1 the deviations to 푞 < 푞∗푝 are not profitable; the deviations to
푞 > 푞∗푝 are profitable (at least for 푞 < 푞
푃
퐿 ) but they are profitable for both types
or only for 훼퐿-type. The deviations to 푞 > 푞
푃
퐿 can be profitable for 훼퐿-type
only. Consequently, any deviation to 푞 > 푞∗푝 can’t reasonably reveal 훼퐻 -type.
So, all the equilibrium from area 1 pass the intuitive criterion.
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Figure 11:
For the case 2 the deviation to 푞 = 푞푃퐻 is profitable for 훼퐻 -type and isn’t
profitable for the 훼퐿-type, so 훼퐻 -type is revealed by such deviation and the
equilibria from area 2 don’t satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Finally, for the case 3, the revealing profitable deviation for the 훼퐻 -type is
constructed in the following way. Since 푞∗푝 > 푞
푃
퐿 there exists 푞
′
퐿 < 푞
푃
퐿 (and then
푞′퐿 < 푞
∗
푝) such that 푉 (푞
′
퐿, 훼퐿) = 푉 (푞
∗
푝, 훼퐿). Notice that 푞
′
퐿 is on the increasing
part of 푉 (푞, 훼퐿), so any 푞 < 푞
′
퐿 is not a profitable deviation for 훼퐿. However,
the deviation to 푞′퐿 is profitable for 훼퐻 -type (the proof is below), and then the
deviation to 푞 = 푞′퐿 − 휀 is the revealing profitable deviation for 훼퐻 type.
Now I proof that the deviation to 푞′퐿 is profitable for 훼퐻 -type. Notice that
the offers 푞 = 푞′퐿, 푞
∗
푝 are accepted for any Best Response acceptance rule. So,
푉 (푞, 푎, 훼푗) = 푉 (푞, 훼푗) ⋅ 1 = 푞 − 훼푗퐶(푞) + 훼푗퐵
Since 푉 (푞′퐿, 훼퐿) = 푉 (푞
∗
푝, 훼퐿), we have
푞∗푝 − 훼퐿퐶(푞
∗
푝) = 푞
′
퐿 − 훼퐿퐶(푞
′
퐿)
By using this, we get
푞′퐿 − 훼퐻퐶(푞
′
퐿) = 푞
′
퐿 − 훼퐿퐶(푞
′
퐿) + (훼퐻 − 훼퐿)퐶(푞
′
퐿) =
= 푞∗푝 − 훼퐿퐶(푞
∗
푝) + (훼퐻 − 훼퐿)퐶(푞
′
퐿) =
= 푞∗푝 − 훼퐻퐶(푞
∗
푝) + (훼퐻 − 훼퐿)퐶(푞
∗
푝) + (훼퐻 − 훼퐿)퐶(푞
′
퐿) =
= 푞∗푝 − 훼퐻퐶(푞
∗
푝) + (훼퐻 − 훼퐿)(퐶(푞
∗
푝)− 퐶(푞
′
퐿))
The second term is positive, so
푞′퐿 − 훼퐻퐶(푞
′
퐿) > 푞
∗
푝 − 훼퐻퐶(푞
∗
푝)
which gives the required inequality:
푉 (푞′퐿, 훼퐻) > 푉 (푞
∗
푝, 훼퐻)
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This finishes the analysis of case 3 and the pooling equilibrium case. We’ve
got that only the equilibria from area 1 satisfy the intuitive criterion.
If an equilibrium is semi-separating, it can have one of the two structures:
푞∗퐻 < 푞
∗
푝 or 푞
∗
퐻 < 푞
∗∗
퐻 < 푞
∗
푝. Consider a deviation of the separating part of the
equilibrium to 푞, which is closer to 푞푃퐻 : 푞 = 푞
∗
퐻 + 휀 if 푞
∗
퐻 < 푞
푃
퐻 , 푞 = 푞
∗
퐻 − 휀
if 푞∗퐻 > 푞
푃
퐻 (it’s impossible to have 푞
∗
퐻 = 푞
푃
퐻 because then 훼퐻 -type strongly
prefers 푞푃퐻 to the pooling part of the equilibrium candidate 푞
∗
푝 , which can’t be
the case in equilibrium). First, 퐽(푞) = {훼퐿} because 훼퐿-type is concentrated on
the pooling part of the equilibrium 푞∗푝; since 푞 < 푞
∗
푝 and 푉 (푞, 훼퐿) is increasing,
the deviation to 푞 is unprofitable for 훼퐿-type. Second, in the intuitive criterion
(29) 푎 ∈ 퐵푅({훼퐻}, 푞), which means that the offer 푞 is accepted with prob-
ability 1: 푎(푞) = 1 and then 푉 ∗퐻 = 푉 (푞
∗
퐻 , 훼퐻) < min
푎∈퐵푅({훼퐻},푞)
푉 (푞, 푎, 훼퐻) with
푉 (푞, 푎, 훼퐻) ≡ 푉 (푞, 훼퐻)).
So, the semiseparating equilibria fails to satisfy the intuitive criterion be-
cause of deviation to 푞, described above for 훼퐻 -type.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. For the case 1 all the Principals have 훼 > 훼×, then, according to Claim
4, the preferred output for all types is feasible. So, accepting all offers 푞푃 (훼) is
reasonable Best Response for the Agent and gives to all types of the Principal
their unconstrained maximal utility.
For the case 2, first proof that there exists unique solution to (31).
For 훼 = 훼× we have 퐸훼× [훼] < 훼
×, and, consequently 푞0 (퐸훼× [훼]) <
푞0 (훼×) = 푞푃 (훼×) < 푞푃 (퐸훼× [훼]), so the left-hand side of (31) is smaller than
than the right-hand side.
For 훼 = 훼2 holds 퐸훼× [훼] = 퐸훼. So, (30) means that the left-hand side of
(31) is more than the right-hand side.
Since both sides of (31) are continuous, there exists unique solution to this
equation.
Second, consider the Agent’s acceptance rule given the Principal’s offer.
Clearly, all offers 푞 > 푞˜0 should be reasonable rejected, offers 푞 < 푞˜0 should be
reasonably accepted with probability 1. The offer 푞 = 푞˜0 should be accepted
with probability 1 on the equilibrium path because accepting it with probability
푎 < 1 will make Principal’s deviation to 푞˜0 − 휀 profitable.
Finally, ant type of the Principal can’t do better since those with 훼 > 훼˜
implement their preferred output, and those with 훼 < 훼˜ could do better only
by implementing 푞 > 푞˜0 which are rejected.
Case 3 is considered in the same way as the pooling part (훼 < 훼˜) in case
2.
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